

103

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS

Y 4. SE 2:103-1-9

Implementation of the Helsinki Acco...

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

CSCME: PROSPECTS FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

OCTOBER 14, 1993

Printed for the use of the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
[CSCE 103-1-9]



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CSCME: PROSPECTS FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 14, 1993

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Washington, DC.

The commission met, pursuant to notice, in room 106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, First and C Streets, NE, Washington, DC, at 2 p.m., Hon. Dennis DeConcini, Chairman and Steny H. Hoyer, Co-Chairman, presiding.

Present: Hon. Dennis DeConcini, Chairman, Hon. Steny H. Hoyer, Co-Chairman, Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Hon. Charles E. Grassley, and Hon. Herb Klein.

Chairman DECONCINI. The Helsinki Commission will come to order. I'd like to welcome our distinguished panelists who are assembled here today to examine the prospects for peace in the Middle East and the applicability of the CSCE-like model in the region.

The recent agreement between Israel and the PLO is a breathtaking development. Yet, it is imperative that these governments and all others interested in promoting peace act on many levels to maintain the momentum of this historic moment.

I firmly believe that the Helsinki, or CSCE process as it's known, could provide all sides with a model to begin building the types of relationships upon which real peace would rest.

Co-Chairman Hoyer and I first raised the potential benefit of a CSCE-type model for the Middle East in 1990 and again at the conclusion of the Gulf War in March 1991 when we testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

I also raised the subject at the subsequent visit to a number of countries in the region. Although I found many leaders receptive to such possibilities, the time for such forward-looking approach seemed premature to many.

Now that a real breakthrough in the Arab-Israel dispute has been achieved, I believe the time has come for the peace process to find greater cohesion and direction in the CSCE-type context.

We must not lose sight of the fact that peace in the Middle East, like peace anywhere in the world, is an evolutionary process which will go through many stages.

The CSCE offers a flexible approach to member states. It offers a process through which confidence-building measures can be developed in the area of human rights as well as security.

These issues will in my view be the key to the success of any real stability in the region. I cannot stress enough how critical the human dimension aspects of the Helsinki process was in broaching the division in Europe during the Cold War.

In the early years, many criticized the seemingly empty promises of the Helsinki process and agreement, but slowly, over time, those promises began to be fulfilled.

Slowly, over time, citizens began holding their governments accountable for making those promises come true. Through the CSCE process, they demonstrated that security is merely a lost thread unless it is firmly woven into a fabric of respect for human rights.

I harbor no illusions about this serious obstacle standing in the path of achieving lasting stability and peace. However, I truly believe that a CSCE-like model offers a process with the best hopes of obtaining these long-term goals.

And I'll submit the balance of my statement because of the time of our witnesses and votes that are coming up, both in the House and the Senate. And I yield to the Co-Chairman, Senator Hoyer, who has been a leader in this process for more years than I can remember and came up with the idea of the CSCE being adopted by countries that are not signators to the Helsinki Accords.

Congressman Hoyer?

Co-Chairman HOYER. I thank the Chairman. I would ask that my statement be included—

Chairman DECONCINI. Without objection.

Co-Chairman HOYER. —in the record at this time, and I will not make a long protracted opening statement because I want to hear from our very distinguished witnesses.

Suffice it to say that I think all of us believe that the Helsinki process created in 1975 had an impact far beyond what perhaps any of the signers conceived.

Certainly that is true of the Soviet signers. Mr. Brezhnev clearly did not perceive the power of the discussion of the principles in relatively unstructured and flexible fora that were created by the process.

It has been my strong belief that there is an analogy to be made between the very substantial differences that have existed in the Middle East over centuries in many respects and certainly over the last several years and the differences, which were 180-degree in 1975, between the Soviet Bloc and the West Bloc. Notwithstanding that, the process established a fora, a regional fora, in which there was discussion of the principles, which are almost universally accepted now.

They may not be universally followed, but they have before universally accepted in international rhetoric. The discussion of those principles month to month, year to year, at the Helsinki review conferences, at experts' meetings, and other CSCE fora have had a very substantial impact.

I believe that can be equally true in a CSCME, a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East. And I am looking forward to hearing the views of some very, very distinguished, experienced, far more than, frankly, anybody on this Commission is, with respect to the applicability of such a model, not exactly, but in some respects, in the Middle East.

I would conclude, Mr. Chairman, by simply saying I think that Russia and the United States, which were important players, not the principal players, but important players, in getting to the historic day that occurred just weeks ago at the White House, when

we saw the Israeli Prime Minister and the leader of the PLO agree to try to move this process forward, in that context, I think that the United States and Russia could participate in a CSCME as the United States and Canada have participated in the CSCE.

I'm looking forward to the testimony of our distinguished witnesses, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman DECONCINI. Thank you, Chairman Hoyer.

Senator Grassley?

Mr. GRASSLEY. This meeting could be a meeting that blazes a trail in the process, major step towards peace in the Middle East. And I hope that it does. So, consequently, I thank the Chairman for holding the hearing.

One month ago yesterday the agreement was signed beginning a process. And then yesterday the process started to work out the details and the implementation of those principles in that agreement.

But the intention of the Israelis and the Palestinians to make peace with one another won't be realized without the cooperation of the Arab states in the region.

One nation, Egypt, has blazed the trail by maintaining peace with Israel for the last 14 years, but the other states must do the same.

The Helsinki format presents an interesting model to try to accomplish this. After all, there were great differences between the East and the West. But the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe gave all European nations a forum for the discussion of arms control, human rights, and economic cooperation.

The Middle East Peace Accords and the process have proceeded on two tracks since the Madrid conference 2 years ago. First, there have been the bilateral negotiations between Israel and her neighbors. Those direct talks yielded the Israeli-PLO breakthrough.

Second, there have been multilateral negotiations on a variety of topics, from refugee issues to the environment to economic development and arms control.

In a sense there is an Helsinki-like formula that is already operational. There are some hurdles to get over, such as recognition and acceptance of Israel and the establishment of diplomatic relations.

That gap did not exist in Europe, for although there were core differences in governments, communism prevailed in Eastern Europe and democracy in the West. And so all nations at least accepted each other.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on this very important issue, and I have particular interest in the impact the Arab boycott continues to have and might have on prospects for peace. I look forward to discussing this with the participants.

Chairman DECONCINI. Congressman Klein?

Mr. KLEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I did not come here to be a participant, but, rather, to be an observer and a listener to this very distinguished panel of witnesses.

And I have a great interest in the cause of peace in the Middle East and look forward with great anticipation to the very learned insights of the distinguished panel.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman DECONCINI. Thank you, Congressman.

Our distinguished panel today includes Dr. Eban, or Ambassador Eban, who is a Shapiro Professor for International Affairs at George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs.

From 1948 to 1959 he served as Israeli's first U.N. Ambassador. As a member of the Israeli Knesset, he chaired the Knesset Committee on Defense and Foreign Affairs from 1984 to 1988.

A world renowned academic, Dr. Eban has been published widely and has received honorary degrees from 17 universities throughout the United States, Europe, and the Middle East.

We also are very pleased to have Ambassador Ahmed Maher El Sayed, who is the Egyptian ambassador to the United States, a post he's occupied this past year. He has served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 1957. He participated in Camp David peace negotiations.

He's held the posts of Director of Policy Planning and Director of Legal Affairs and International Treaties Department. Previously Ambassador El Sayed served as Egypt's Ambassador to Portugal, Belgium, the U.S.S.R., and Russia.

We're also very pleased to have Dr. William Zartman, who is a Blaustein Professor of International Organizations and Conflict Resolution and Director of African Studies at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.

He's published extensively, lectured worldwide on international mediation, negotiation theories, and conflict resolutions in the Middle East. Dr. Zartman has examined the applicability of CSCE-like models in other regions. A member of the Council on Foreign Affairs, he is also a consultant to the U.S. Department of State.

We'll start with Ambassador Eban. Ambassador?

TESTIMONY OF HON. ABBA EBAN, FORMER FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTER OF ISRAEL

Dr. EBAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm very grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, and to you, the members of this Commission, for the warmth of your welcome and for your courteous invitation.

As a member of parliament in a democratic country for 29 consecutive years, as a cabinet member for 15 of those years, and as Chairman of the Knesset Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense, I learned something about the parliamentary life. That unique alternation between rivalry and solidarity illustrates the paradox of the democratic idea.

The central theme of my own political action was always the relationship between Israel and the United States. Nevertheless, as Minister for Foreign Affairs in the early 1970's, I arrived at the conclusion that the European Community should be a source of deep preoccupation for us.

I know that Americans like coming to a point very quickly. So I shall content myself with a few headlines about the ideas that unite the Middle East with Europe before submitting myself to your questioning, which is, I believe, our main task this afternoon.

I agree with the distinguished Senators and Representatives who have already spoken about the moment of truth with the Final Act at Helsinki on August the 1st, 1975 and with the three baskets, so

strangely named, which express the style and purpose of modern Europe.

I was the first in my capacity as Foreign Minister to sign an agreement at Strasbourg and have it ratified in Brussels establishing an association between Israel and the European economic community. That association has grown deeper and wiser with the intervening years.

Now, what is it that the Middle East as a whole and Israel, in particular, can learn from Europe? From Europe we can learn the lesson of reconciliation. European history, after all, is drenched with more blood, pulsates with more recollections of hatred and anguish than our Middle East.

And, yet, we have witnessed a spectacular process of conciliation, beginning with the Egyptian-Israeli treaty of 1979 signed here in Washington and continued with the Israeli-Palestinian agreement of 1993. Clearly these documents, these agreements, these accords have sent the Middle East on an entirely new path.

The recollections of tragedy in Europe and the effects of that tragedy on the Jewish people are very still prominent in our national consciousness. And, yet, Europe has shown an extraordinary capacity for resilience, recuperative power.

The Nazi decade lasted only for 10 years. And, yet, with what admirable speed did Europe heal its wounds, rebuilt itself, revive its economy, and renew its creative zest.

From Europe's example, we learn that the transition of the Middle East from conflict through realistic prudent accords cannot be abrupt, but it does not have to be slow.

In the Middle East, as with Europe, the key to peace lies in institutionalized regional cooperation. Israel and its neighbors must not be divided from each other in hermetic boundaries.

They must and they should develop such intensity of cooperation, such mutual accessibility, such freedom of economic and human interaction, and such reciprocity of interests as to put war beyond any contingency.

Now, the European Community idea has achieved that result in parts of Europe. I believe, therefore, that Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians, Israelis, Jordanians, Palestinians, should form a community of states independent in their individual jurisdictions and cultures, but linked by community obligations across open boundaries.

This sounded like a utopian dream a few years ago. Yes, but so did the crumbling of the Berlin Wall. So did the rise of 15 independent republics out of the Soviet Union. So did the liberation of the Baltic states.

And so did the decision of the industrialized nations in the Washington meeting last month to make large new resources, up to \$2 billion, available in order to assist the self-governing authority in Gaza and in Jericho.

The action of an American administration in bringing Israelis and Arabs to the negotiating table 3 years ago was a shining achievement. And today the United States alone has the influence necessary to bring Syria into habits of conduct and neighborliness, which are indispensable for the success of what has already begun to grow.

Mr. Chairman, your Commission's memorandum "Beyond the Process" utters a lament on the failure of the CSCE to maximize its procedures. It seems to friendly observers that what is important is not the bureaucracies that you create, but the problems that you help to solve.

With grievous events in the former Yugoslav area and in Georgia and in some of the republics of the former Soviet Union, your Commission, comprising nearly 50 European states plus the United States and Canada, has no lack of challenging agendas.

I would like to state here that if this Commission wished to establish a replica of itself in accordance with the Helsinki pattern, I believe that Israel would welcome participation and would regard it as a positive development.

All of your member states are either in official reactions with Israel or are about to become so. I couldn't have uttered that sentence even a few years ago.

The peace process has already produced immense dividends for our country. Never was Israel more secure against external dangers, less physically vulnerable, more free for regional initiatives than it is today.

It is not a question of exchanging tangible assets of territory for intangible peace accords. Peace accords sustained by indispensable military strength and carefully monitored arrangements on the ground have proved to be a more tangible guarantee of security than coercive jurisdictions can ever produce.

This insight, which became an article of official Israeli policy by the electoral decisions of our country June 1992, has contributed to the swift growth of our international friendships, now reaching into the giants of the third world, India and China, towards the once hostile Arab and Muslim worlds.

Let me say a word about our relations with the Arab and Muslim world. Though this would be part of any contingency such as the establishment of a Helsinki Commission, it is not true that our cultures are engaged in a life and death conflict between Israel and Islam or between the Jewish Muslim and Arab peoples.

We have peace with Egypt. We are negotiating with the Palestinians. We are conferring with Syria, with Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. And we are welcome guests in Morocco. We are negotiating in Tunisia.

In other words, a situation where you couldn't establish multilateral organizations without excluding either Israel or the Arab states, that situation is now over. And I believe, therefore, that the ground is congenial for the kind of initiative, a part of which you are deliberating.

Sustained by its physical strength and moral purpose, Israel now has a democratic mandate for innovation and compromise. There is the sense of a new tomorrow waiting to be born.

And, therefore, a link or an emulation between Israel and your Commission of the 50 is, I think, both feasible and probably essential for the further development of our international network. This would not be contradictory to the specified association that Israel enjoys by contract with the European economic community.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman DECONCINI. Thank you very much.

Ambassador El Sayed, I want to first thank you personally for being available earlier this year. You were very enthusiastic about testifying before this Commission. We just couldn't quite schedule a hearing earlier, although I appreciate your taking the time to be with us today.

**TESTIMONY OF AMBASSADOR AHMED MAHER EL SAYED,
AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES FROM EGYPT**

Ambassador MAHER EL SAYED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Commission, I must first of all express my deep gratitude and my thanks not only for allowing me to appear before you, but to appear as a member of such a distinguished panel.

When I was still a young diplomat, Mr. Abba Eban was such an eminent personality that it is indeed a great honor to participate with him in this panel. Professor Zartman needs no more words to say how distinguished he is and how appreciated his opinions and his ideas are.

Mr. Chairman, in September 15 years ago, the Camp David Accords were signed here in Washington. And a month ago, as Senator Grassley just mentioned, the agreement between the PLO and Israel was signed on the South Lawn of the White House.

I heard some people say that 15 years were lost, that this was a very long time to go from a peace between Egypt and Israel to a generalized peace in the area.

I don't think that this is true. I think those 15 years were necessary to show that peace between Egypt and Israel works, that it can sustain many difficulties, that it can overcome many obstacles, and that it can come to fruition in the area.

I believe the signature by Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat of the agreement between Israel and the PLO has heralded a new world in which we now live and in which we hope to build a new Middle East and a new order in this very tormented area and region of the world.

As an example, I want to tell you that a few weeks ago, I attended a conference at the State Department for donors who were willing to support peace in the Middle East.

And I was really very surprised and very happily surprised to hear the representatives of Israel speak about "our colleagues from the PLO." At this particular moment I realized that we were entering the new world.

What had happened? I mentioned a minute ago the example of Egypt. Peace between Egypt and Israel has been able to overcome many difficult situations, many obstacles.

I remember that even in 1982 with the invasion of Lebanon, there was nobody who thought that this would be the end of the peace agreement between Egypt and Israel. We objected to Israel's actions. We supported the Lebanese people.

We condemned the invasion, but never did we think that this was the end of peace. This was one of the most difficult moments, but nobody ever thought that this would be the end of a process started in Camp David.

It is true that we withdrew our ambassador then, but diplomatic relations remained and were maintained, and normal contacts between the two countries remained. This is the first element.

The second element, of course, is the role of the United States government. Under the previous administration and the present administration, there is a continued effort. There was a continued effort. There still is a continued effort to bring the parties together, to have them sit around the table and negotiate, injecting from time to time ideas, proposing solutions.

And this very important U.S. role, which led to Madrid and also led to the Oslo meeting because it had created the environment and the atmosphere necessary for the continuation of the negotiations, was a very important element.

The third element is the courage of leaders on both sides. The meeting between Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat was not an easy one. They came to it with a lot of difficult luggage, with a lot of historical souvenirs that were not always happy, but they both had the courage and the leadership to come and to preside over the signing of this agreement in Washington. This is another manifestation of the importance of personalities in shaping history.

I think the most important element was that both parties had learned that it was time to put an end to illusions. The truth and realities have caught up with everybody.

On the Israeli side, the illusions that were shattered were: the illusion that there is no such thing as a Palestinian people; that the PLO did not exist as a political organization; that there was no necessity for withdrawals from occupied territories; that what should be achieved was peace for peace, meaning change on one side and the status quo on the other side; and that it was possible to achieve peace while putting under the rug very important problems, like the problems of refugees and the problem of Jerusalem.

A moment came when these illusions were shattered because of the courage of many people and because the people of Israel decided that as they wanted peace, there was a price for peace to be paid.

The Arabs at the same time had to abandon many of their illusions. One of these illusions was that there was no necessity to recognize Israel. Another illusion was the mirror image of the illusion of peace for peace, that they could obtain withdrawal of the Israeli forces and at the same time keep some sort of status quo ante where they did not have to enter into normal relations with Israel.

So these illusions having been shattered, it was normal that the two parties would come together on a new slate, determined to reach an agreement, and to build together peace.

And the example I just cited about the way the Israeli and PLO delegations dealt with each other at this conference proved that the movement for peace, once started, is accelerated and that we have gone a very long way.

Since the difficult negotiations in Washington, since the very intense negotiations in Oslo, since the signature, we have come to what we see today. In the papers, for instance, a picture of the foreign minister of Israel and the representative of the PLO smiling and laughing and discussing, as a civilized people, as people who

want to reach agreements and who are determined to make this agreement succeed.

What is needed to make this agreement succeed, I think, is not only the good will of both parties, but also the ability to create an environment that is conducive to the success.

Part of this environment is certainly to achieve progress in these negotiations toward agreeing on the Gaza-Jericho status, on the self-government in the occupied territories, and also on the vision of the future because I think the agreement has a very important aspect, which is for the first time in such an agreement economic cooperation, both bilateral and regional, has been given such a prominent role.

Also to create this environment, I think there should be progress on the other tracks of negotiations because I don't think that we can achieve a stable situation in the Middle East, we cannot build the new Middle East we have been dreaming of unless we pacify all of the fronts of the confrontation between Israel and the Arab countries.

As I said, illusions have been shattered, but we should not fall into new illusions. We should not imagine that the problems that are still there are easy.

The problems are enormous, but the difference is that they are being tackled not from the prospect of confrontation, but from the prospect of a desire to make them succeed.

For the first time, the Israelis and the Palestinians are not looking at each other in anger, but are looking together towards building the new Middle East that we all want to build.

And Egypt, in particular, is gratified that it was the first to have among the Arab countries this vision and it was the first to have the courage to work for it and to pay the price, a very heavy price indeed, to achieve this result.

What we need to do is to put flesh on the ideas of economic cooperation contained in the agreements between the PLO and the Palestinians. This is the first confidence-building measure that we can think of.

As to the other confidence-building measures, the model of the CSCE is a very important model. I would just stress the most important elements of this.

The first one is dialogue and, as Mr. Eban said, reconciliation. The reconciliation in Europe took a very long time to mature, but it was obtained. And this is exactly what we want to achieve in the Middle East.

The second element is the involvement of the people. This is something that a Commission like yours—and all of us have a responsibility to create, which is contact between the peoples.

I must interject what was said about the peace between Egypt and Israel. For a long time, it was called cold peace because it was, in fact, an official peace.

The people were not willing to participate in building this peace. The reason was from our side that we felt that it would not be possible to establish people to people relationships while the problem of Palestine and the problem between Israel and the other countries remained. Now I think we have a chance to create these con-

tacts and these currents of communication and of interaction between the people.

The third thing, of course, is regional cooperation. This is envisaged not only in the agreement between Israel and the PLO, but also in the fact that there are multilateral commissions negotiating various aspects of the future relationship between countries of the Middle East.

Of course, in the case of the Middle East, it is very difficult to start by thinking of confidence-building measures. I think we should incrementally through the negotiations, through the success of the negotiations, open the way for further measures concerning, for instance, weapons of mass destruction concerning other ecological problems, other very important problems that should be tackled, but should be tackled incrementally.

I don't think it would serve any purpose to jump immediately to some of these confidence-building measures, but we should build them incrementally and step by step provided that there is the determination to go to the end of this road. And I think there is this determination now.

Senator Grassley mentioned the differences between the two processes in Europe and the Middle East. I think this is a reality that should be taken into account. But what we should all keep our minds on is that this is a new world.

We should look at the problems from the perspective of peace, from the perspective of cooperation. And if we do that, many of the problems that appear intractable would then be much easier to solve like the problems of security.

I think the problem of security, if you look at it from the perspective of the next war, then you can think in terms of keeping territories, of keeping armed forces, of refusing to disarm certain areas.

But if you look at security from the point of view of the necessary cooperation and of the determination to cooperate and to live together, then many of these problems of security can be easily solved.

I do not want to go on giving my ideas because I'm sure that I will have further opportunity in answer to your questions, which I'm sure will cover a much broader spectrum than what I have tackled here.

I just want to say that this is a time of hope and challenge. The challenges are enormous, but the hope is even greater. We are looking to the future with a determination to making it a better future for all the peoples of the world, for our sons and grandsons.

As the process that took place in Europe is now given as an example, we are determined to have the Middle East process become an even more important example for the future generations.

Thank you, sir.

Chairman DECONCINI. Ambassador, thank you very much for that testimony.

Dr. Zartman?

TESTIMONY OF DR. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, BLAUSTEIN PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND DIRECTOR OF AFRICAN STUDIES AT JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Dr. ZARTMAN. Mr. Chairman, Senators, Representatives, it is a real honor for me to be here and particularly an honor for me to be here with my very distinguished colleagues.

There's no doubt and little disagreement that CSCE has been of major importance in preparing and smoothing the transition from the Cold War confrontation in the area between the United States and the former Soviet Union to cooperation in that same region and to the establishment of a security community.

Nearly 2 decades of experience of the CSCE show the importance of establishing goals and standards for cooperation, providing the conditions of transparency in regard to security, and to the establishment of missions and diplomatic encounters that have given rise to further agreements among countries within the region.

In addition, CSCE has been useful as a model for other regions of the world. This Commission has already looked at the CSSDCA experience in Africa. Other private initiatives within Southern Africa have given rise to a regional proposal for a conference on cooperation and security in Southern Africa, CCSSA, an idea which, like CSSDCA, has not been adopted, but which, nonetheless, remains on the unofficial table as a subject of discussion.

It should be noted that CCSSA in Southern Africa applies to the one region which until recently was the sole to replicate the experience of Europe; that is, a place where a confrontation along a battle line began to dissolve in favor of new possibilities of cooperation among former enemies.

Since August the experience of CSCE finds itself applicable to the Middle East. Now that a tangible step has been made in the peace process in regard to the Palestinians similar to the disengagement agreements which Israel signed with Egypt and Syria nearly 20 years ago, but even more significant in its implications, the situation is now appropriate for the establishment of a conference on security and cooperation in the Middle East modeled on the European experience.

It should be remembered that CSCE was set up before the end of the Cold War in order to prepare for evolving new relations and to provide for trust in security and mutual respect as the basis for cooperation.

As long as Arab states refused to negotiate with Israel and Israel refused to negotiate with the PLO, the conditions required for the establishment of a CSCE in the Middle East did not obtain. But since the Madrid process created communication between adversaries in the Middle East, the possibility was opened up for a framework for broader cooperation in the region surrounding the progress which is promised by the Oslo agreements on subjects of immediate concern to the mutual security of the states of the entire region.

Progress in creating mutual security along the recognized Israeli borders requires a larger context, a series of baskets in which to nest these specific peace agreements between Israel and its neigh-

bors in order to create the same conditions of trust, security, and mutual respect, which the CSCE has contributed to Europe.

We should perhaps remind ourselves that there is already a section in CSCE that refers to the Middle East and, therefore, gives an entry for that kind of a spirit into the region.

Nonetheless, there are a number of aspects in the establishment of a CSCME which differ significantly from the European experience or from the African proposals. One has to do with the need to bring in all of the players in the region, a phrase that appeared significantly in Representative Hoyer's remarks in 1991 as one of the conditions.

Unlike Europe, the Middle East is plagued with a number of rogue players who will be difficult to bring into a CSCME process and who, even if brought in, are not likely to be trustworthy participants.

These include Iraq under the present government, possibly Libya, and even from time to time Syria, former members of the Steadfastness Front. They may also include Sudan under its present government.

Clearly, it is important to make sure that Syria is brought into any CSCME, whose effectiveness would be vitiated without it. Other rogue players, however, are marginal enough so that their absence should not inhibit the creation of a security and cooperation conference. Indeed, one of the advantages of the conference would be to note their behavior and develop regional and global pressure for them to join in a peaceful concert of states.

On the other hand, the model CSCE also suggests that a Middle East conference should also include non-regional powers, notably the United States and possibly other interested countries from the north, such as Britain, France, Germany, and Russia.

Here the experience of the Middle East differs significantly from that of Europe. In Europe the United States was part of the security and cooperation considerations of the region. And although it is separated from Europe by the Atlantic, it was an integral participant in the basic security concerns and one of the poles of the security tensions.

In the Middle East, the United States and other northern powers have a decidedly external role. And the basic interpretation of history in much of the Middle East sees that role as one of meddling interference and imperialist conspiracy.

This is not to suggest that the United States should stay out of a CSCME. It is, rather, to suggest that the United States should play its role as unobtrusively as possible.

Its presence will often be necessary to facilitate as well as to guarantee elements of cooperation among the states, but it should be careful never to become a crutch.

The United States role in the Camp David agreements was, for all its imaginative diplomacy, that of a crutch. And the peace process between Israel and Egypt was never able to walk on its own, but remained dependent on American administrations.

One of the advantages of the current evolution of the Madrid process, however shocking that may be in the United States, was that the Oslo agreement was made by the participants themselves

with only a minimal role of the mediator as a communicator, not as a formulator or as a manipulator.

For CSCME to work effectively, its initiatives will have to be taken and performed by the parties of the region, not by manipulative mediation methods from outside powers.

At the same time, the American role can only be undertaken if there is a deep commitment on the part of officials to continue to perform along the lines of the engagements that the United States will have made.

There may be little doubt that the United States will continue its engagements in Europe. Despite the importance of the Middle East to American commitments and American security, it is less assured that the United States will always have the same commitment to maintaining its role in regard to the Middle East.

If countries of the Middle East were able to develop their own peace process, that evolution would be far preferable to one that depended on external forces, but if the United States is to be an active, even if discrete, member of the peace and security process in the Middle East, it should recognize that it is in for the duration.

The current criticisms that come from members of the American legislature about the durability of American commitment to United Nations operation in Somalia after the first few casualties are suffered is not a promising omen for the durability of the American commitment to security concerns in other parts of the world.

If we are to continue to be the leading world citizen with global responsibilities and with a sense of security that depends on stable conditions in cooperation and significant other parts of the world, Congress needs to be in the forefront of an education process to the American public about the commitments that we have made.

Public opinion needs to be led in an assurance that the United States will maintain its role and not be frightened home by outlaws who would challenge world efforts at restoring and maintaining stability and security.

We can only encourage the creation and participation of a conference in security and cooperation in the Middle East if we are willing to live up to our pledges of maintaining those values in the region.

Thank you.

Chairman DECONCINI. Thank you, Doctor, very much.

We have some time constraints. The Senate is having a vote right now, and I'm going to have to leave. Congressman Hoyer has a meeting at 3:00 o'clock with the Speaker, and Mr. Cardin says he can stay for a while, subject to votes.

I'm just going to ask one question here. Mr. Eban, Ambassador, do you think the process of establishing a process like CSCE which has a substantial human rights component is realistic? Would it be embraced by the countries in the Middle East, where democracies and fundamental freedoms in many of those countries have not taken hold yet?

Dr. EBAN. Mr. Chairman, as you have hinted, of course, there is no consensus. There is no unity amongst the peoples of the Middle East about the applicability of human rights. They differ pro-

foundly in their social structures and in the present stage of their evolution.

Nevertheless, it does seem to me that if the project for CSC Middle East goes forward, there would not be very much choice. And I believe all of the existing members, all of the 50, would have to be capable of being admitted.

And in the Middle East also, I think it would not be feasible to exclude anybody. We in Israel are sensitive to this point of exclusion.

You might ask: Why has the United Nations not been able to establish an economic commission for the Middle East? The answer is that until the breakthrough first with Egypt and now with the Palestinians, Arab states would not participate. And, therefore, this important dimension of United Nations work was not operative.

I believe the only choice would be absolute openness for all of the 50 members and openness for all Middle Eastern states. As regards the 50 members—

Chairman DECONCINI. In other words, Ambassador, if they would join, you would assume that they were going to comply with whatever the human rights provision was?

Dr. EBAN. Well, one would hope that that would be the case, but I do tell you that they're all members of the United Nations. They're all signatories of the convention on human rights and fundamental freedoms signed in 1948. And, as I've said, there are very many, to put it delicately, differences of interpretation.

I do not believe that at this present stage, you could have any multilateral international organizations based on anything except fully open doors. You are then faced with the 50, the problem of what I would say overpopulation of committees.

I, therefore, would imagine that the 50 would do very well if they were to make small committees with those who are more intimately associated with the Middle East than with others.

Chairman DECONCINI. Thank you.

Ambassador El Sayed, I'm sorry I have to leave to go vote. Maybe you can comment on that after Co-Chairman Hoyer asks his questions because he also has to leave. I would like to have it for the record. I apologize, gentlemen. Do you have time to?

Ambassador MAHER EL SAYED. Yes. Without expressing any of value, I would like to point out to the impact that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe had on the human rights problem in the Soviet Union and the former East European countries.

I think it had a very important positive aspect. When these countries joined the conference, they were accused of blatant violation of human rights, and we saw how through the process of this conference a lot of progress has been achieved. So I just want to put it as a general observation.

I think there are violations of human rights in many of the countries of the Middle East, not excluding anyone, but I think that participating in such a process would certainly be very helpful towards enlarging the respect of human rights in all of the countries of the area.

Chairman DECONCINI. Chairman Hoyer?

Co-Chairman HOYER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I was impressed with the testimony of all of you. Doctor, I read your testimony while I was sitting here, somewhat to the detriment of the Ambassador's testimony, but then I caught up with his testimony.

As I understand the premise of all of you, a CSCME, perhaps not directly tracking a CSCE model, but, nevertheless, patterned after that, is an idea that all of you think is viable and useful. Am I correct on that presumption?

Also, let me ask you a question to follow up on the human rights question that Senator DeConcini asked. In the Soviet Bloc in 1975, the rhetoric was similar. The constitutions even of the Warsaw Pact nations spoke of many of the things that democratic constitutions speak of.

What Brezhnev and the Soviet Union did not perceive was that there would be such an impetus through discussion in international fora to make them reality. The Helsinki monitors had a real impact, Sakharov, Orlov, and all the Warsaw Pact nations.

My question is, is there an analogy to be made or is the gulf far greater, as I think you would imply, in terms of the cultural, political premises, not the practices, but the premises, much, much greater than it was between the Soviet Union and the West? Mr. Ambassador?

Dr. EBAN. I would think, Mr. Chairman, that the gulf in rhetorical terms between the Soviet Union and the Western world was not simply in vocabulary, that there were different conceptions of what the citizens should or should not be able to do within an ordered society.

But I certainly agree with my Egyptian neighbor that the effect on those who violate human rights according to our conceptions, that there was an educative effect of the necessity for them to hear about other systems and to try to adapt themselves to other systems.

And I do notice, as you have implied, sir, that even the Soviet Union when it was practicing a fairly repressive regime always used the vocabulary of the West.

I myself remember sitting at many meetings with the late President Gromyko when he was Foreign Minister. On one occasion when we were discussing religion, he suddenly said "Thank God I am an atheist."

[Laughter.]

Co-Chairman HOYER. Can I just follow up? I understand what you said. Really, you repeated, Mr. Ambassador, what I had said in terms of the rhetoric being the same. The problem, once the rhetoric is the same, then you discuss the interpretation.

What we found was that Sakharov and others in the Soviet Union took Western rhetoric which had been adopted by the Soviet Union and said, "This is what it means." And it really had over time a very great impact.

My perception is there has been a growing international, almost universal acceptance of the rhetoric.

Dr. EBAN. True.

Co-Chairman HOYER. The Helsinki process then tested performance against rhetoric, and took on individual cases, which Ambas-

sador Goldberg was, I think, most responsible for bringing about in the Helsinki process.

What I'm asking for is: For instance, in Syria, Iraq, Iran, or other possible Arab signatories to a CSCME, is it your perception that there is similar rhetorical similarity so that in a CSCME one could test performance against that rhetoric? Is there sufficient similarity?

Dr. EBAN. On the positive side, sir, I would say that there's more chance of cooperation on matters of security and on matters of economic development than perhaps on matters of human rights because there are some who are almost theologically forbidden to think in the same terms about the rights of women, for example.

There are some countries where certain indulgences are very severely punished and others where they are not. I would, therefore, not think that human rights would be the chief source of harmony.

Nevertheless, I believe that hearing critical references from one colleagues and neighbors—and here I return to what the Egyptian Ambassador has said—would have an educative effect, but it is not possible to impose upon cultures, especially upon religious cultures, the ideas that are common to all.

I, therefore, believe that the emphasis ought to be on security matters and economic cooperation, I would say what I would call the secular matters, which are under consensus.

Co-Chairman HOYER. Mr. Ambassador?

Ambassador MAHER EL SAYED. Well, I did say, sir, before that I believe there is certainly a gulf between some of the rhetoric and some of the practice.

It is not confined to one country or the other, not certainly only to the countries that Ambassador Eban mentioned. There are violations of human rights to a degree or another that are attributed to many of the countries in the Middle East, even to Israel.

Co-Chairman HOYER. Mr. Ambassador, if I could interrupt?

Ambassador MAHER EL SAYED. Yes.

Co-Chairman HOYER. I agree with you.

Ambassador MAHER EL SAYED. Yes.

Co-Chairman HOYER. And, of course, in 1975 there was a great gulf between what the Soviet Union said it believed in and what it did. That is, I think, a given. The question really is: Is there sufficient agreement on principles to even have a forum to discuss those principles?

Ambassador Eban I think probably makes a pretty cogent comment as it relates to security and economic cooperation, that they are probably more viable in this context, but while I'm not a Middle East expert nor an Arab expert by any stretch of the imagination and so I'm really trying to learn—my question really is whether there is a sufficient agreement on principles to begin talking. I'd be interested in your perspective on that part of it.

Ambassador MAHER EL SAYED. Exactly. I would just simply say that I don't know of any country that would in principle refuse or be able to refuse to participate in a forum that would deal with human rights.

And just by participating, even if the rhetoric is different from the practice. There is an educational process, there is pressure of public opinion, of expressed public opinion, on the human rights.

So I think there will have to be through this process an evolution towards more respect of human rights. So I think this will be a very positive development, sir.

Co-Chairman HOYER. Dr. Zartman, would you like to comment on that?

Dr. ZARTMAN. Yes. I think two parts to an answer. First of all, if there is a difference, I think it's a matter between the Soviet situation and the situation in the Middle East in the difference in rhetorical principles, which is what you're after. It's a matter of degree, rather than a matter of absolutes.

Certainly as countries in a world community required to justify themselves both before their own people and in the United Nations, there's much of this rhetoric that's adopted by all of the governments of the Middle East.

And if, as Ambassador Minister Eban has said, some people are theologically prevented from subscribing to certain principles, they are in almost no case the government. There are currents of opinion, and there are also currents of opinion who would subscribe very actively and who are putting pressures on their own governments, Sakharovs, if you will, in the Middle East, who very much adopt the same kind of language.

The Koran certainly can provide quotations that support the same kind of values that we're talking about, and I think we're put in a very defensive position, wrongly, by labeling these things Western values. These are universal values, but, as we know from Vienna this past year, that's an important debate.

The other part is, to simply pick up and add to the point that Ambassador Eban has mentioned, other sections may be of more importance to countries in the region, security, economic, but, after all, Helsinki was based on a trade-off.

The Soviet Union wanted recognition for its borders and, therefore, was able to sign the rhetorical principles. And we played on that trade-off back and forth.

A CSCME would be based on a trade-off as well. And if trade interests people, one can tie trade to human rights. There are other things, other baskets, in Helsinki or in CSCME.

Co-Chairman HOYER. Thank you.

Mr. Cardin?

Mr. CARDIN. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Co-Chairman HOYER. By the way, I would mention that you just heard the bells again, and we have a vote. All three of us would, therefore, have to leave.

Rather than have you sit there, I would think we'd probably ought to try to complete before we leave.

Mr. CARDIN. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I want to thank all three of our panelists for being here today and helping us in these deliberations and also for bringing us to this moment in the Middle East, where we have the real opportunity for peace.

Dr. Eban has been an outspoken advocate of a process that would lead to lasting peace in the Middle East for a long time. We appreciate the role that you have played. Mr. Ambassador, by taking the courage to move towards peace in the Middle East your country has obviously brought us to where we are today. Dr.

Zartman, your work on developing mechanisms for communication in peace have all led, I think, to the successful completion of the agreement between the Palestinians and the Israelis.

I was very interested in the comments raised about how a CSCE-type process would work in the Middle East. Dr. Zartman, you made a very interesting observation about the difference between the Camp David accords and the role that the United States played in the most recent agreements.

I have some concerns. I support a process similar to that of the CSCE. However, if its membership is limited only to the countries of the Middle East, there is a real danger that there would be significant isolation of Israel by the overwhelming number of Arab states. This could be a real problem or not without some degree of input from other countries.

You raise the importance of having some input by the United States and perhaps some of the European countries, without them being intrusive into the process.

So I guess I would appreciate if each of you could comment on how we achieve this balance. How do we set up a process that will not be unfair towards Israel regarding the number of participants and, yet, not allow outside countries to be too intrusive in communications and finding solutions to problems? Do you have any further insights to how that type of process could be developed.

Dr. EBAN. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would say that we in Israel are somewhat enured to unfairness arising from statistics. That is to say, in the United Nations body, for example, we are one. And we face, I dare to say, 25 Arab countries and perhaps 40 or 50 Muslim countries. And, yet, we have managed to survive arithmetical inferiority.

We have suffered much more from nonapplicability of the universal principle because when it comes to a problem of exclusion, we have suffered exclusion from bodies to which our exclusion has really no sense except ancient prejudices and acrimonies. Therefore, I think that we will have in the end to make do with the principle of universality.

It is, for example, illegal to convene a meeting under United Nations auspices if anybody is excluded. And we have always stood in favor of that principle, but how to ensure that we would be equal contenders with others, I would have to say we would have to believe, however unrealistically, that you can sometimes transcend quantity by quality and matter by spirit.

Ambassador MAHER EL SAYED. If I might just interject, what we are thinking of is a process that will be part of the process of peace. So it will not be an arena for confrontation between Israel and the other countries, but it will certainly be a process arrived at after agreements between Israel and the other countries have been reached, and it will be an arena for further cooperation, for further improvement of the situation for all the countries in the Middle East. So I don't think that the question of imbalance will play its role in this particular forum.

But, on the other side, I do support a very active role by the United States and the European countries in this process in the Middle East. We know that already in the process of the CSCE in Europe, there is mention of the link between security in the Middle

East and security in Europe. Security in Europe is very closely linked to the security of the United States.

So I think it is very clear that the United States and Europe will have to be part of this process because they have an interest, they have a national interest, their security is linked to the security of the Middle East.

So I cannot imagine a situation where this process we are envisaging would take place in the Middle East without an active participation of the United States and of Europe.

Thank you, sir.

Dr. ZARTMAN. What I was referring to was the way in which the role was played and not to a differentiation in membership. That's subtle, but diplomacy is subtle.

I agree with you it's not possible, as I look at the situation, to see a CSCME that is limited to the ME members.

And, as I mentioned, I think a number of other northern countries would properly be involved. But I hope that we would play that role not looking for limelight and playing it modestly because we have to realize that to many people in the Middle East, a role in limelight is a role of domination. And we will de-legitimize the kind of cooperation we seek to foster by being too prominent in it.

There is another point as well, though. I think that the concern about one country or another being in a minority all by itself continues to be legitimate, but as this interaction continues on various subjects within a CSC of any kind, it creates cross-cutting interests and coalitions and at least pressures to bridge the political divide.

And so I wouldn't be idealistic and simply lay all faith in that mechanism, but the mechanism is there, and it can bring countries together. And that's what one hopes the process does.

Mr. CARDIN. Thank you.

Co-Chairman HOYER. Mr. Klein, did you want to ask a short question? We have about 8 minutes.

Mr. KLEIN. It's going to be less than that because we have to go vote.

First of all, I did want to observe I'm delighted to see Ambassador Eban, who probably does not recall, but a number of years ago when I was in New Jersey legislature, Ambassador Eban was our guest at a joint session of the legislature, and I was delighted to be able to host it.

Dr. EBAN. Yes. I still have the gavel.

Mr. KLEIN. Very good. Well, I'm honored that you recall.

When I see the opportunities for synergistic benefits in the peace in the Middle East, it pleases me immeasurably. And one of the things that troubles me is the continued boycott that exists. It seems to me that it is counterproductive to the interests not only of the Israeli people, but also of all of the Palestinians and other Arab peoples in the Middle East.

And I would wonder whether you foresee—and I address this question to any of you—the opportunity for ending the boycott and for mutual cooperation on trade matters in the Middle East between Israel and other Arab countries.

Dr. EBAN. I would say, sir, that it is a serious paradox that we should be celebrating peace at so many levels and, yet, witness the continuation of the boycott.

I don't by this mean to indicate that the boycott really strangles Israel. On the contrary, it has the effect of a response to challenge because Israel has been excluded from trading with its neighbors.

It has developed a much more sophisticated Swiss/Japanese style of export and technology than it otherwise would have had, which means that there's a dialectic that will sometimes get the consequence opposite of that which you desire, and that has been the case with the boycott.

It doesn't arise very much on the Palestinian level because there the sheer gravity of proximity, the flow of workers and employers means that there's naturally a boycott in that level. And it's, after all, the Palestinian agreement that has been most featured.

But it would be interesting to hear from representatives of the Arab states, such as Egypt itself, which, of course, is not a practitioner of the boycott, about whether a mediator, such as President Mubarek, might be able to find out why it's necessary for Saudi Arabia, for the Gulf states, to maintain the boycott, even on paper.

Co-Chairman HOYER. Herb, did you have a follow-up?

Mr. KLEIN. No, I had no follow-up question.

Co-Chairman HOYER. Let me apologize. The three of you are very distinguished individuals, and we have, unfortunately, not had the time to really get into this discussion nor do we have as many members here as I would have hoped.

I think this CSCME idea—and I have for the last 4 or 5 years—shows great promise. I was of the opinion that it could not possibly happen until there was a bilateral accommodation, if not rapprochement, at this point in time.

It was also, I think, not possible—Mr. Ambassador, you mentioned the 15 years were not wasted. Those who say, "Gee, this should have been done earlier if President Carter had only been stronger or pushed harder."

My opinion is the rapprochement or the steps toward rapprochement could not have happened absent the ending of the Cold War because as long as you had the East-West confrontation, as long as the parties could play off the superpowers against one another, I think you had great difficulty.

And, very frankly, I don't think it would have happened without the Persian Gulf War, which changed the dynamics in the Middle East. It changed the thinking of the Arab states, in my opinion. So I think we have moved in a timely fashion.

I don't expect tomorrow to have a conference on establishing the CSCME, but, then again, the Soviets stated talking about the idea at least a decade before it happened. Obviously they were perceived to do it for the purposes, Doctor, as you point out, of de facto recognition of existing borders.

But I am hopeful that individuals, leaders, great world prominents, like all three of you and some of us, could work towards this objective because I think it could go a long way towards solidifying the gains that have been made by some very courageous people. And I think it would be very worthwhile for the entire world.

So thank you very much, appreciate your expertise and your time.

Dr. EBAN. Thank you, sir.

[Whereupon, the foregoing matter was concluded at 3:17 p.m.]

A P P E N D I X

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

237 FORD HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
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STATEMENT OF SENATOR DENNIS DeCONCINI

Chairman: Helsinki Commission

PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE PROSPECTS

October 14, 1993

106 Dirksen Senate Office Building

I would like to welcome our distinguished panelists who are assembled here today to examine the prospects for peace in the Middle East and the applicability of a CSCE-like model in the region. The recent agreement between Israel and the P.L.O. is a breathtaking development. Yet it is imperative that these governments and all others interested in promoting peace, act on many levels to maintain the momentum of this historic moment. I firmly believe that the Helsinki or CSCE process could provide all sides with a model to begin building the type of relationships upon which real peace will rest.

Co-Chairman Hoyer and I first raised the potential benefits of a CSCE-type model for the Middle East in a letter to President Bush in 1990. We again advocated this at the conclusion of the Gulf War in March 1991 when we testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I also raised the subject during a subsequent visit to a number of countries in the region. Although I found many leaders receptive to such a possibility, the time for such a forward looking approach seemed premature to many. Now, that a real breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli dispute has been achieved, I believe the time has come for the peace process to find greater cohesion and direction in a CSCE-type context.

We must not lose sight of the fact that peace in the Middle East, like peace anywhere in the world, is an evolutionary process which will go through many stages. The CSCE offers a flexible approach to member states -- it offers a process through which confidence-building measures can be developed in the area of human rights as well as security. These will, in my view, be the key to the success of any real stability in the region. I cannot stress enough how critical the human dimension aspect of the Helsinki process was in broaching the divisions in Europe during the Cold War. In the early years, many criticized the seemingly empty promises of Helsinki. But slowly, over time, those promises began to be fulfilled. Slowly, over time, the citizens held their governments accountable for making those promises come true. Through the CSCE process, they demonstrated that security is merely a loose thread unless it is firmly woven into a fabric of respect for human rights.

I harbor no illusions about the serious obstacles standing in the path of achieving lasting stability and peace. However, I truly believe that a CSCE-like model offers a process with the best hopes of attaining these long-term goals. When the CSCE process was initiated, serious obstacles divided an armed and bitter Europe. Eighteen years later, while ancient antagonisms still plague Europe, many divisions are healing, former enemies are in the process of disarming, and democracies are emerging in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The CSCE process contributed much to these developments. As the Balkan conflict is tragically demonstrating, however the process is only as strong as the political will of its member states. Europe, the United States and Canada have, in my view, shamefully violated the most fundamental principles in the CSCE process by their collective refusal to stand up for the sovereign rights of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. They must also bear some of the responsibility for the genocide which has taken place in the Balkans. But despite the Balkan tragedy, I still firmly believe in the CSCE process for Europe and I believe it offers a model which the countries of the Middle East can adapt to fit their own mutual needs. Israel, Egypt and all the countries of the Middle East have an historic opportunity to begin healing the wounds of their bitter conflict. For the sake of peace, I urge them to seriously consider the CSCE model.

COMMISSION ON
SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

237 FORD HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515

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STATEMENT BY STENY H. HOYER
Co-Chairman: Helsinki Commission

CSCE Hearing on Regional Peace Efforts in the Middle East

106 Dirksen Senate Office Building
October 14, 1993

The recent mutual recognition agreement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization is an historic step forward. Having fundamentally altered the politics of the Middle East, it makes the possibility of a broader security framework a reality. For decades the Middle East has been a region dominated by violence, its politics largely reflecting the Israeli-Palestinian question. Few channels exist through which Middle Eastern states and their peoples can address region-wide issues. A Middle East security framework could encourage regional security through arms control, verification, confidence-building, and respect for human rights. The presence of a multilateral forum for discussion would provide an outlet for grievances and a framework for conflict resolution. States would need only be assured that participation would not prejudice their individual interests and that each state's security would be enhanced through participation in region-wide talks.

I believe that a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (CSCME), modeled on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), could make a significant and constructive contribution to that end. It offers a process by which barriers to trade, travel and communication can be discussed and removed; in which old hatreds and passions can be channeled into constructive dialogues between states and peoples; and within which regional stability can be established.

The CSCE -- also known as the Helsinki process -- was born with the signing of the Helsinki Final Act on August 1, 1975. This document marked the beginning of a remarkable political dialogue in a bitterly divided, heavily armed, post-war Europe. By providing for periodic follow-up meetings, the CSCE brought hostile states to the table over and over again to address the issues which separated them in the areas of military security, human rights and trade. The issues were divisive, the discussions contentious at times, but each state felt it had a stake in the process. Furthermore, dialogue in the CSCE was not restricted to states, it involved their peoples to a very large degree. Ordinary citizens and non-governmental organizations took up the moral debate and the notion of accountability and injected them back into the political realm of the CSCE. These aspects of the CSCE -- political dialogue and public participation -- are critical in the Middle East.

And I believe that both the United States and Russia could play an important role in seeing that a CSCME process is initiated because both share interests: containing radical Islamic fundamentalism, stemming terrorism, and securing peace and security in the region. Of course, there are no guarantees that a CSCME could solve the complex and explosive problems confronting the Middle East. Meetings and documents change nothing by themselves if the political will of the participating States is in question. But we are now at an historic juncture where long-absent political will may suddenly exist. We have just witnessed an agreement which has made the conditions for a long-term peace better than they have ever been before. In such a climate, a CSCE-type process can bring strength in its persistence, in its relentless determination to foster continued political will among its participating States and, just as important, among their citizens.

Mr. Chairman, I think it is very important that these hearings are being held and that they are being held at this time. I want to welcome our very distinguished guests and I look forward to hearing from each of them on the prospects for peace in the Middle East.

PERSONAL STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE ABBA EBAN, FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER OF ISRAEL, BEFORE THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE.

October 14, 1993

(Mr. Eban is the Shapiro Professor of International Affairs at the George Washington University)

I am grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, and to you, the members of this Commission, for the warmth and sincerity of your welcome.

As a member of parliament in a democratic country for 28 consecutive years (1959 to 1988), as a Cabinet member for fifteen of those years and as the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee of the Knesset toward the end of my parliamentary tenure, I learned something about parliamentary life - the unique alternation between solidarity and rivalry that illustrates the paradox of the democratic idea.

The central theme of my own political action was the relationship between Israel and the United States. Forty two years have passed since I presented my credentials to President Truman. Credentials are never memorable as works of art and they usually lie buried in leather for the whole of their natural life - unsung, unhonored and unread. President Truman feared that I might read them aloud and he preempted that danger by snatching them from my hand saying "Let's cut out all the ceremonial crap and have a serious talk".

I learned from this that Americans like coming to a point quickly and I shall content myself with a few headlines about the ideas that unite the Middle East with Europe before submitting myself to your questioning which is our main task this afternoon.

Europe celebrated a high moment of truth with the Final Act at Helsinki on August 1, 1975 and with the three baskets, so strangely named, that expressed the style and purpose of modern Europe.

What is it that the Middle East as a whole and Israel in particular can learn from Europe?

From Europe we can learn the lesson of reconciliation. The process begun with the Egyptian-Israeli treaty of 1979 and continued with the Israel-Palestinian agreement of 1993 set the Middle East on a new path. European history is drenched with more blood, pulsates with more recollection of hatred and anguish than our Middle East,

and yet with what admirable speed did it heal its wounds, rebuild its ruins, revive its economy and renew its creative zest after the tragic Nazi decade! Think of it, there was only one Nazi decade and what havoc it accomplished!

From Europe's example we learn that the transition of the Middle East from conflict to realistic, prudent accords, cannot be abrupt but it does not have to be slow.

In the Middle East, as with Europe, the key to peace lies in institutionalized regional cooperation. Israel and its neighbors must develop such intensity of cooperation, such mutual accessibility, such freedom of economic and human interaction, such reciprocity of interests as to put war beyond contingency. The European community idea has achieved that result in parts of Europe. Israel, Jordan and Palestinians should form a community of states, independent in their individual jurisdictions and cultures, but linked by community obligations across open boundaries. This sounded like a utopian dream a few years ago, but so did the crumbling of the Berlin Wall. So did the rise of fifteen independent republics out of the Soviet Union -which was never a union. So did the liberation of the Baltic States. So did the decision of the industrialized nations in the Washington meeting last month to make large new resources available for the area of Palestinian self-government. The 1990s are the age of dreams that come true. The action of an American administration in bringing Israelis and Arabs to the negotiating table three years ago was a shining achievement. Today, the United States alone has the influence necessary to bring Syria into habits of conduct and neighborliness which are indispensable for the success of what has already begun to grow.

Mr. Chairman, Your commission's memorandum "Beyond Process" utters a lament at the failure of the CSCE to maximize its procedures. It seems to friendly observers that what is important is not the bureaucracies that you create but the problems that you help to solve. With grievous events in the former Yugoslav area and in Georgia, and some of the republics of the former Soviet Union your commission, comprising nearly fifty European states plus the United States and Canada has no lack of challenging agendas.

All your member states are either in official relations with Israel or about to become so. I could not have uttered that sentence a few years ago.

The peace process has produced immense dividends to our country. Never was Israel more secure against external dangers, less physically vulnerable, more free for regional initiatives than today. It is not a question of exchanging tangible assets of territory for intangible peace accords. Peace accords, sustained by indispensable military strength and carefully monitored arrangements on the ground, have proved to be a more tangible

guarantee of security than coercive jurisdictions can ever produce. This insight which became an article of of official Israeli policy by the electoral decision of June 1992 has contributed to the swift growth of our international friendships, now reaching into the giants of the Third World, India and China and creeping inexorably toward the once hostile Arab and Muslim worlds.

Sustained by its physical strength and moral purpose, Israel now has a democratic mandate for innovation and compromise. There is the sense of a new tomorrow waiting to be born.

Statement of Professor I. William Zartman, Jacob Blaustein Professor of International Organization and Conflict Resolution, The Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, October 14, 1993, before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe of the United States Congress.

There is no doubt and little disagreement that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has been of major importance in preparing and smoothing the transition from Cold War confrontation in the area between the United States and the former Soviet Union to cooperation in that same region and the establishment of a security community. Nearly two decades of experience of the CSCE show the importance of establishing goals and standards for cooperation, providing for conditions of transparency in regard to security, and to the establishment of missions and diplomatic encounters which have given rise to further agreements among countries within the region.

In addition, CSCE has been useful as a model for other regions of the world. Perhaps the most important transfer of the European experience has been to the African continent where the African Leadership Forum, in 1991, proposed a Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and Cooperation in Africa (CCSSDCA), which has subsequently been submitted to the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Despite the obduracy of the OAU, the principles of CCSSDCA have served as a conscious to the Club of African Heads of State, and have made their way into the thinking of African leaders, even though all concrete provisions of the Kampala Document still remain to be institutionalized within the OAU. Similarly, other private

initiatives within Southern Africa have given rise to a general proposal for a Conference on Cooperation and Security in Southern Africa (CCSSA), an idea which has not been adopted, but which nonetheless, remains on the unofficial table as a subject of discussion. It should be noted that CCSSA applies to the one region which, until recently, was the sole [one] to replicate the experience of Europe, that is a situation where a confrontation along a battle-line began to dissolve in favor of new possibilities of cooperation among former enemies.

Since August, the experience of CSCE also finds itself applicable to the Middle East. Now that a tangible step has been made in the peace process in regards to the Palestinians, similar to the disengagement agreements which Israel signed with Egypt and Syria nearly twenty years ago, but even more significant in its implications, the situation is appropriate for the establishment of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (CSCME), modeled on the European experience. It should be remembered that CSCE was set up before the end of the Cold War in order to prepare for evolving new relations, and to provide for trust, security, and mutual respect as the basis for cooperation. As long as Arab states refuse to negotiate with Israel, and Israel refuses to negotiate with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the conditions required for the establishment of a CSCE in the Middle East did not obtain. But once the Madrid process created communication between adversaries in the Middle East, the possibility was opened for an ongoing

framework for broader cooperation in the region, surrounding the progress which is promised by the Oslo Agreements on subjects of immediate concern, to the mutual security of the states of the region. Progress in creating mutual security along the recognized Israeli borders requires a larger context -- a series of baskets -- in which to nest these specific peace agreements between Israel and its neighbors, in order to create the same conditions of trust, security and mutual respect which the CSCE has contributed for Europe.

Nonetheless, there are a number of aspects to the establishment of a CSCME which differ significantly from the European experience or from the African proposals. One has to do with the need to bring in all the players in the region. Unlike Europe, the Middle East is plagued by a number of rogue players who will be difficult to bring into a CSCME process, and who, even if brought in, are not likely to be trustworthy participants. These include Iraq under the current government, possibly Libya, and even from time to time, Syria, former members of the Steadfastness Front. They may also include Sudan under its present government. Clearly, it is important to make sure that Syria be brought into any CSCME, whose effectiveness would be vitiated without it. In the case of other rogue players, however, they are marginal enough that their absence should not inhibit the creation of a Security and Cooperation Conference. Indeed one of the advantages of the Conference would be to focus

on their behavior and develop regional and global pressure for them to join in a peaceful concert of states.

On the other hand, the model CSCE also suggests that a Middle East Conference should also include non-regional powers, notably the United States, and perhaps other interested countries from the North, such as Britain, France, Germany, and Russia. Here the experience of the Middle East differs significantly from that of Europe. In Europe, the United States was part of security and cooperation considerations of the region, and although it is separated from Europe by the Atlantic, was an integral participant in the basic security concerns, and one of the poles of the security tensions. In the Middle East, the United States and other Northern powers have a decidedly external role, and the basic interpretation of history in the Middle East sees that role as one of meddling interference and imperialist conspiracy. This is not to suggest that the United States should stay out of a CSCME. It is rather to suggest that the United States should play its role as unobtrusively as possible. Its presence will often be necessary to facilitate, as well as to guarantee, elements of cooperation among the states. But it should be careful never to become a crutch. The United States role in the Camp David Agreements was, for all of its imaginative diplomacy, that of a crutch, and the peace process between Israel and Egypt was never able to walk on its own, but remained dependent on American ministrations. One of the advantages of the current evolution of the Madrid process, however shocking it

may have been to the United States, was that the Oslo Agreement was made by the participants themselves, with only a minimal role of the mediator as a communicator, not as a formulator or as a manipulator. For CSCME to work effectively, its initiatives will have to be taken and preformed by the parties of the region, not by strong-arm peacemaking methods from outside powers.

At the same time, the American role can only be undertaken if there is a deep commitment on the part of American officials to continue to perform along the engagements that the United States will have made. There may be little doubt that the United States will continue its engagements in Europe, despite the importance of the Middle East to American commitments and American security. It is less assured that the United States will always have the same commitment to maintaining a role in regard to the Middle East. If countries of the Middle East were able to develop their own peace process, that evolution would be far preferable to one that depended on external forces. But, if the United States is to be an active, even if discreet, member of the peace and security process in the Middle East, it should recognize that it is in for the duration. The current criticisms that come from members of the American legislature about the durability of American commitment to a United Nations operation in Somalia, after the first few casualties are suffered, is not a promising omen for the durability of the American commitment to security concerns in other parts of the world. If we are to continue to be the leading world citizen with global

responsibilities, and with a sense of security that depends on stable security conditions and cooperation in significant other parts of the world, members of Congress need to be in the forefront of an education process to the American public about the commitments we have made. They need to be leading that public opinion, in an assurance that the United States will maintain its role and not be frightened home by outlaws who would challenge world efforts at maintaining stability and security. We can only encourage the creation and participation in a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East if we are willing to live up to our pledge of maintaining those values in the region.

I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval, "Mediation: The Role of Third-Party Diplomacy and Informal Peacemaking," in Sheryl J. Brown and Kimber N. Schraub, editors, Resolving Third World Conflict Challenges for a New Era (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1992).

Chapter 9

Zartman and Touval are well known for their work in the field of third-party diplomacy and informal peacemaking; indeed, their formulations have become the accepted terms of the field. This chapter is a primer in third-party mediation. Zartman and Touval begin simply. They say that mediation is a triangular relationship: the mediator and two parties to the conflict. A third-party mediator can be any entity that is not a party to the conflict: a superpower, a middle- or small-sized state, an international or regional organization, or an unofficial person. They explain the function of a mediator and identify all the factors involved in the mediation relationship: the third party's motivation for wanting to be a mediator, the disputing parties' motivation for accepting a mediator, the best timing for initiating mediation, modes of mediation, and what constitutes leverage.

So straightforwardly do they present these factors that a layman can easily understand the dynamics involved in setting the stage for mediation. Their work, as this representative piece demonstrates, by virtue of its clarity, makes conflict mediation less an alchemy and more a science or a craft with identifiable steps leading to its success.

Conflicts over politico-security issues take place within a context of power politics, which, the authors maintain, has a major effect on the mediation process. Each party must have some interest in resolving the conflict. Determining the strength and content of those interests and ranking them is what Zartman and Touval call "interest calculation." Employing this calculation helps third parties to recognize when the parties to the conflict might be ready to accept mediation and who might have the most interest in mediating a conclusion. Of course, how the parties perceive and rank their own interests is determinative; actual interest can be countered by perceived interest.

Zartman and Touval conclude by observing that the underlying causes of conflict in the Third World will remain unaffected by the end of the Cold War. They postulate, however, that because of reduced interest in the Third World on the part of Western and Eastern bloc constituents, the amount of resources directed to these

areas will likely diminish. This means that third-party interest in mediating Third World conflicts may also decline. The result should be that conflicting parties will need and want to conclude conflicts sooner than they did during the Cold War. Zartman and Touval's conclusion points out that while the ebb and flow of each party's interest depends on the international situation, the *sine qua non* of successful mediation is the abiding interest of at least two parties in resolving the conflict.

Mediation: The Role of Third-Party Diplomacy and Informal Peacemaking

I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval

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Most international conflicts become subject to third-party mediation. Surveying a wide variety of international conflicts—including economic as well as politico-security disputes—in the period from 1816 to 1980, Edward Levine found 322 mediation attempts.¹ Saadia Touval, examining mediation by the United States and the Soviet Union in conflicts over politico-security disputes between 1945 and 1980, found that the United States was involved as mediator on at least ninety occasions, and the Soviet Union on at least twenty.²

Over the years, studies examining the causes of conflict have proliferated, but scholarship and understanding of conflict mediation do not show the same development. Studying international mediation

has been primarily the work of scholars rather than practitioners, and they have only laid the groundwork for understanding the reasons and the ways parties mediate international conflict.¹

"Conflict" here refers to politico-security issues. In international economic or environmental disputes, rival parties are typically not as forcefully competitive nor are the means of conducting the dispute as violent as in politico-security conflict. Conflicts over politico-security issues take place within a context of power politics, which has a major effect on international mediation. This premise provides the conceptual underpinning of our analysis of the participants' motives in mediation, the conditions that affect the performance and roles of mediators, and the keys to effective mediation of international conflicts.

The empirical base for our theoretical formulations consists of a number of historical studies of successful mediation in the Third World.² Although all the cases examined occurred during the Cold War, their validity is not limited to this particular period: our theoretical observations hold for mediation in international politics in general. Nevertheless, the question arises whether the abatement of Soviet-American tensions has created circumstances that are more or less propitious for conflict reduction through mediation than the circumstances that existed during the Cold War.

Mediator's Functions

Mediation is a form of third-party intervention in a conflict. It is a mode of negotiation with the stated purpose of contributing to the conflict's abatement or resolution. To accomplish its purposes, mediation must be made acceptable to the adversaries in the conflict, who in turn must cooperate diplomatically with the intervener. But mediators often meet initial rejection from the conflicting parties, thus their first diplomatic effort must be to convince the parties of the value of their services before the mediation process can get started. Mediation differs from other forms of third-party intervention in conflicts because it is not based on the direct use of force and it is not aimed at helping one of the participants win. Yet the process covers a number of similar activities: like good offices, it is concerned with helping the adversaries communicate; like conciliation, it emphasizes changing the parties' images of and attitudes toward one another. But mediation performs additional functions. Mediators can suggest ideas for a compromise, and they can negotiate and bargain directly with the adversaries. Mediation is basically

a political process with no advance commitment from the parties to accept the mediator's ideas. In this respect it differs from arbitration, which employs judicial procedure and issues a verdict that the parties have committed themselves to accept.

Mediator's Motives

States use mediation as a foreign policy instrument. Their intervention as mediators is legitimized by the goal of conflict reduction, which they typically proclaim. The desire to make peace, however, is intertwined with other motives best described within the context of power politics. For an understanding of these motives it is most helpful to employ a rational-actor approach, using cost-benefit considerations. Because mediators are players in the plot of relations surrounding a conflict, they possess a certain interest in its outcome; otherwise, they would not mediate. In view of the considerable investment of political, moral, and material resources that mediation requires and the risks to which mediators expose themselves, motives for mediation are found as much in self-interest as in humanitarian impulses. Mediators are seldom indifferent to the terms being negotiated. Even when they seek peace, they try to avoid terms not in accord with their own interests, which usually allow a wider range of acceptable outcomes than the immediate interests of the parties. They also have greater flexibility in bargaining because they incur fewer commitments and invest less in the conflict than the parties do. Self-interested motives are the same for superpowers, medium-sized powers, and international organizations.

Mediation by States

Mediating states are likely to seek terms that will increase the prospects of regional stability, deny their rivals opportunities for intervention, earn them the gratitude of one or both parties, or enable them to continue to have a say in future relations between adversaries. Two types of self-interest can be promoted through mediation. One is essentially defensive: a continuing conflict between parties threatens the mediator's interests. Therefore, an end to the conflict is important to the mediator because of the conflict's effects on the mediator's relations with the disputing parties. For example, if two of the mediator's allies engage in a conflict, that conflict can disrupt and weaken the alliance or strain the parties' relations with

the third-party mediator. A conflict between two states also may upset a regional balance or provide opportunities for a rival power to increase its regional influence by intervening on one side of the conflict.

In some situations, a regional conflict may threaten to escalate and draw in additional parties. Actors who fear such escalation may seek to reduce the conflict to avoid becoming involved in hostilities. Mediation in such cases may involve one intervener or it may be a collective endeavor by two or more states acting inside or outside the framework of an international organization. Even rival powers protecting their turf are known to have cooperated and engaged in joint mediation in such situations (e.g., U.S.-Soviet cooperation on Laos in 1961-62 and on the Arab-Israeli war in 1973).

The second self-interested motive for mediation is offensive: the desire to extend and increase influence. In this case, the solving of the conflict has no direct importance for the mediator and is only a vehicle for improving relations with one or both parties. A third party may hope to win the gratitude of one or both parties in a conflict, either by helping them out of the conflict or by aiding one of them to achieve better terms in a solution than would otherwise be obtainable. Although the mediator cannot throw its full weight behind one party, it can increase its influence by making the success of the negotiations depend on its involvement and by making each party depend on it to garner concessions from the other party. Mediators can also increase their presence and influence by becoming guarantors of any agreement, which necessarily includes risks and responsibilities.

A number of historical examples illustrate these interests. U.S. mediation in the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe conflict and the Soviet mediation between India and Pakistan were inspired by a mixture of defensive and offensive motives. From a defensive vantage, the United States feared the Rhodesian conflict would provide opportunities for the Soviet Union to gain influence by supporting the African nationalists. But because the African groups concerned were already politically close to the Soviet Union and China, the U.S. mediation was also an attempt to improve relations with these groups and thus extend American influence.

Soviet mediation between India and Pakistan was partly inspired by its desire to improve relations with Pakistan, which had hitherto been on better terms with the United States and China than with the Soviet Union. It also sought to build its prestige and establish a precedent that would justify future involvement in the affairs of the region. At the same time, there were important defensive motives for its intervention. The Indo-Pakistan conflict provided China with

an opportunity to extend its influence into Pakistan and thus establish a presence close to the southern borders of the Soviet Union. Reducing the conflict would make this expansion more difficult for China.

The United States has been the most active mediator of international conflicts since 1945.⁷ This finding is consistent with an interest-based explanation of mediators' motives. Because the United States feared that conflicts would provide the Soviet Union with opportunities to intervene and expand its influence, the United States often sought to dampen conflict, and mediation was an appropriate instrument to that end. In addition, without reference to the Soviet Union, U.S. help was sometimes solicited by smaller states engaged in conflict because of U.S. power and prestige. Pressed by its friends for support and always fearful that support for one side in a local conflict would throw the other side into the Soviet embrace, the United States often found that the least risky course in such situations was to mediate between the disputants.

That Americans have been involved in mediation more often than the Soviets can easily be understood if we remember the preeminent status that the United States has enjoyed in international politics for many years and the unequal extent of the two powers' spheres of influence. The Soviet sphere was at first limited to Eastern Europe and China. But in the mid-1950s, it began expanding to include a few additional countries that became dependent on Soviet military aid (at the same time, however, China broke away from the Soviet sphere). The remainder of the world, sometimes called the noncommunist world, was considered by the United States as part of its sphere (notwithstanding that some states in this group proclaimed themselves to be nonaligned). Although actual American influence varied among these noncommunist states, what they had in common was that the Soviet Union carried less influence there than the United States did. The claim made in 1971 by Andrei Gromyko, then Soviet foreign minister, that Soviet interests extended to every corner of the globe and that "there is no question of any significance that can be decided without the Soviet Union or in opposition to it" reflected ambition rather than reality. Thus, the wider sphere of American influence explains why the United States mediated so many more conflicts than the Soviets did.

Mediation by Small- and Medium-Sized Powers

Mediation by small- and medium-sized powers is also motivated by self-interest, some of which is related to such domestic concerns

as, for example, the possibility that a conflict may spill over into the mediator's territory (India in Sri Lanka before its military intervention); the fear that the local conflict may expand and draw in powerful external actors; the reluctance to take sides in a conflict between other nations (Saudi Arabia in many inter-Arab conflicts); and the attempt to promote norms that tend to enhance the mediator's own security (the 1963 Ethiopian mediation between Algeria and Morocco concerning the validity of borders inherited from the colonial period).

Small- and medium-sized powers may also wish to enhance their influence and prestige through mediation. Egypt and Algeria mediated between Iran and Iraq in 1975 because they wanted to prove their usefulness to both belligerents as well as reduce intra-Islamic conflict. Algerian mediation between the United States and Iran on the issue of American hostages seems to have been inspired by the hope that mediation would generate goodwill from the U.S. public toward Algeria and thus help improve relations between Algeria and the United States. This hope was related to U.S. support for Algeria's adversary, Morocco, in the Western Sahara war against the Algerian-supported Polisario movement. Other cases in which states sought to enhance their international standing through mediation include India's attempt to mediate between the United States and the Soviet Union and China in the 1950s, the effort by Nkrumah of Ghana to mediate in the Vietnam War in 1965-66, and Romania's try at an intermediary role in that same conflict, in U.S.-Soviet relations, and in Arab-Israeli relations (notably in helping to arrange President Anwar Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977). Small and medium states have few alternative foreign policy instruments at their disposal, and mediation increases their usefulness and independence vis-a-vis stronger allies. Moreover, when pressed to take sides in a conflict, they may seek to escape their predicament by assuming the role of a mediator in the conflict.

Mediation by International Organizations

The motives of international organizations are somewhat more complex than those of states. Peacemaking is the *raison d'être* of several international organizations and is thus enshrined in their charters. Yet intergovernmental organizations are also instruments of their member states. Accordingly, the UN was greatly handicapped by the Cold War and engaged in peacemaking much less than its charter suggested it should. The few mediation efforts in

which it engaged were often smoke screens to conceal the intensity of American involvement (e.g., in the Arab-Israeli conflict). Regional organizations were not hindered by the Cold War to the same extent as the U.N. But, because mediation required agreement among the organizations' most influential members as well as acceptance by the parties directly involved, regional organizations were not as actively engaged in peacemaking as they might have been.

Nonstate mediators, whose interests are not as apparent or suspect as the primary players of power politics, nevertheless share motives of self-interest. At the very least, nonstate mediators have a role and a reputation to establish or defend and thus an interest in appearing as good and successful mediators. (The concerns of the World Council of Churches and the All-African Council of Churches in launching their mediation of the Sudanese civil war in 1971 is an interesting example.¹¹) Often this role extends beyond mediating to become an organizational interest in "being there" and in keeping the organization clean and ready for other functions. In this regard, nonstate mediators come very close to state mediators in the nature of their interests.

Concern for peace as a value in and of itself, suspicion of interested mediators' motives, and perception of the inherent limitations on states' mediating roles have led a variety of nonstate actors to propose themselves as international mediators. Many of them are interested in a particular outcome not because it affects them directly but because they believe in its inherent desirability. For example, the several private agencies striving for usefulness in the Rhodesian civil war were working to find an acceptable path to Zimbabwean independence, not some other outcome. All nonstate actors have an interest in enhancing their positions as useful third parties not out of any venal egotism but because they believe they have something to offer, and a reinforcement of their standing and reputation helps them do their job.

The Parties' Motives in Accepting Mediation

Opponents in a conflict face two interrelated questions: whether to accept mediation and, if so, which offer of mediation to accept? Parties accept intervention because they, like mediators, expect it to work in favor of their interests. The most obvious motive is the expectation that mediation will gain an outcome more favorable than the outcome gained by continued conflict—that is, a way out. The parties also hope that mediation will produce a settlement when

direct negotiation is not possible or will provide a more favorable settlement than can be achieved by direct negotiation. Although the adversary may not have a similar assessment, it may accept and cooperate with the mediator if it feels that rejection might cause even greater harm—for example, damaging relations with the would-be mediator, decreasing the chances for an acceptable negotiated outcome, or prolonging a costly conflict. Such considerations sometimes help induce states to accept intervention even in domestic conflicts (e.g., Sri Lanka's acceptance of India's mediation, and Angola's acceptance of America's mediation). The parties also may accept mediation in the hope that the intermediary will help reduce some of the risks entailed in concession making and the costs incurred in conflict, thus protecting their image and reputation as they move toward a compromise. They may also believe that a mediator's involvement implies a guarantee for the final agreement, thereby reducing the danger of violation by the adversary.

The acceptance of mediation by international organizations can also be premised on the ability of these organizations to bestow normative approval rather than on their capacity to influence the adversary or arrange for a satisfactory compromise. This point is present in the case of the UN but is perhaps clearest in the case of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The ICRC's ability to offer an improved image to a fighting or detaining authority can be a powerful incentive for the parties to accept its presence and services and for acceding to its proposals.

Partiality and Acceptability

If the acceptance of mediation is based on a cost-benefit calculation then the assumption that mediators must be perceived as impartial needs to be revised.⁷ The mediator's impartiality is not as important to the adversaries' decision to accept mediation as their consideration of the consequences of accepting or rejecting mediation, namely, how will their decision affect the prospects of achieving a favorable outcome? And how will it affect their future relations with the would-be mediator? Initially, third parties are accepted as mediators only to the extent that they are seen as capable of bringing about acceptable outcomes; their subsequent meddling is tolerated because they are already part of the relationship. Although there is no necessary relationship between a mediator's past partiality and its future usefulness, good relations between it and one of the adversaries may in fact be an aid to communicating, to developing

creative proposals, and to converging the two parties' positions. Closeness to one party implies the possibility of "delivering" it, thereby stimulating the other party's cooperativeness. Indeed, the implications of closeness can be carried one step farther: since mediators are not likely to be successful (that is, attractive to the other party) if they are perceived as preferring a solution that favors the party they are close to, a biased mediator's acceptability and success lie in the likelihood of its delivering the party toward which it is biased into an agreement.

Several examples illustrate these points. In the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe mediation, the Africans' belief that British and U.S. sympathies were with the white Rhodesians rendered British and U.S. mediation promising and stimulated African cooperation. In several mediations between Arab parties and Israel, the Arabs' belief that the close American-Israeli ties would enable the United States to deliver Israeli concessions made American mediation attractive to them. In the Tashkent mediation, the Soviet Union was accepted as a mediator by Pakistan despite its close relationship with India. Pakistan perceived the Soviet Union as (1) concerned enough about Pakistan's growing cooperation with China to want to improve its relationship with Pakistan and (2) close enough to India to bring it into an agreement. Algeria was accepted by the United States as a mediator with Iran not because it was considered impartial but because its ability to gain access to and facilitate the agreement of people close to Khomeini held promise that it might help to release the hostages.

Although they cannot fully side with one party, mediators can allow themselves some latitude in degree of partiality. This latitude may allow them to express their preference regarding the outcome of the negotiation. In the Zimbabwe and Namibia negotiations, the United States was not indifferent to the nature of the settlement. The outcome had to open the way for majority rule. Although this meant that the United States supported the essence of the African position and, by implication, sought to eliminate the white settlers as a sovereign political actor, the white settlers nevertheless accepted U.S. mediation as a means of getting them out of a no-win situation.

An interest in specific outcomes is quite common in the mediations of international organizations. The U.N., the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Organization of American States, and ICRC all have some general norms that they wish to uphold beyond the principle of peaceful settlement. They try to promote solutions that can be interpreted as compatible with the standards of the Geneva conventions and of their charters and that protect their

image as a guardian of these standards. Indeed, they can formally condemn parties for deviating from these standards as a means of enforcing them. On the other hand, the OAU was so strongly attached to the principle of successor state inviolability that it was incapable of mediating the Biafran conflict, so strongly attached to the principle of *uti possidetis* (legitimacy of inherited boundaries) that it was unable to mediate the Ogaden war, and so strongly attached to the principle of noninterference in internal affairs that it was unable even to constitute a commission to mediate the Sudanese and Rwandan civil wars.

Acceptance of mediation, whether the mediator is a state or an international organization, is not automatic. It depends on the promise of attractive outcomes for the parties. When the OAU establishes an ad hoc commission to mediate a dispute, consultation procedures give the parties an implicit say in the composition of the commission. The result is often a balanced slate rather than an impartial commission, because members are likely to seek to protect the interests of their friends and not to form their views solely on the basis of objective criteria.

As an independent nonstate agency, the ICRC does not have partiality or composition problems. Nevertheless, its acceptance as a mediator is still not automatic. Conflicting parties are concerned not about whether the ICRC will perform its humanitarian functions objectively but about whether the legal framework of its involvement will further their interests. States may deny that an armed conflict that would justify an ICRC intervention is occurring or has occurred. Yet the legal framework is sometimes subject to negotiation, and the terms of involvement can be influenced by their perceived effect on the interests of the parties rather than by the parties' perception of the ICRC's impartiality.

Mediators must be perceived as having an interest in achieving an outcome acceptable to both sides and as being sufficiently impartial as to permit such an achievement. Again, the question for the parties is not whether the mediator is objective but whether it can provide an acceptable outcome.

Timing of Mediation

Since mediators are motivated by self-interest, they will intervene not automatically but only when they believe a conflict threatens their interests or when they perceive an opportunity to advance their interests. Such threats and opportunities are unlikely to be noticed

when there is a mild disagreement between parties: it is usually after the conflict escalates that its implications are perceived. By then, the parties are likely to have become committed to their positions and to a confrontational policy, ever reducing the common grounds on which that mediation must proceed. For that mediation to succeed, the parties must be disposed to reevaluate their policies.

Two conditions are especially conducive to such reevaluation: *hurting stalemates* and *crises bounded by a deadline* or, to use a metaphor, *plateaus* and *precipices*.⁶ A hurting stalemate begins when one side is unable to achieve its aims, resolve the problem, or win the conflict by itself; it peaks when the other side arrives at a similar perception. Each party must begin to feel uncomfortable in the costly dead end that it has reached. This plateau must be perceived by both sides not as a momentary resting ground but as a flat, unpleasant terrain stretching into the future, providing no later possibilities for decisive escalation or graceful escape.

Mediation plays up the parties' perceptions of having reached an intolerable situation. Without this perception, the mediator must depend on persuading the parties that breaking out of their deadlock is impossible. Indeed, the mediator may even be required to make it impossible. Deadlock cannot be seen as a temporary stalemate, to be easily resolved in one's favor by a little effort, a big offensive, a gamble, or foreign assistance. Rather, each party must recognize its opponent's strength and its own inability to overcome that strength.

For the mediator this means emphasizing the dangers of stalemate as each side comes to recognize the other's strength. Each side's unilateral policy option—to take action without negotiation—must be recognized as a more expensive, less likely way of achieving an acceptable outcome than the policy of negotiation. A plateau is therefore a matter as much of perception as of reality for the parties and a subject as much of persuasion as of timing for the mediator. Successful exploitation of a plateau shifts both sides from a winning to a concluding mentality.

A *crisis of precipice* represents the realization that matters are swiftly becoming worse. It implies impending catastrophe, such as probable military defeat or economic collapse. It may be accompanied by a policy dilemma that involves engaging in a major escalation, the outcome of which is unpredictable, or seeking a desperate compromise that threatens one side as much as the other. It may also be a catastrophe that has already taken place. Whatever its tense (because parties are bound to disagree about the inevitability of an impending event) it marks a time limit to the judgment that "things can't go on like this."⁷

For the mediator, the crisis qua precipice should reinforce the dangers of the plateau, lest the parties become accustomed to their uncomfortable deadlock. Mediators can manipulate crises: they can use them and they can make them. If there is a recognized impending danger, mediators can use it as a warning and as an unpleasant alternative to a negotiated settlement. And if they do not agree that a crisis exists, mediators can work to implant a common perception that it does. In its most manipulative role, a mediator may have to create a precipice, usually citing pressure by a fourth party. That is what the United States did in 1977 to get the Namibia negotiations started, citing irresistible pressure for sanctions if the sides did not start talking.

Modes of Mediators

Mediators use three modes to marshal the interests of all the involved parties toward a mutually acceptable solution to the conflict. In order of their involvement in conducting mediation, the mediator uses *communication*, *formulation*, and *manipulation*.

When conflict has made direct contacts between parties impossible, thereby preventing the flexibility required for making concessions without appearing weak or losing face, the mediator can serve as communicator. In this situation, mediators simply act as conduits, opening contacts and carrying messages. They may be required to help the parties understand the meaning of messages through the distorting dust thrown up by the conflict or to gather the parties' concessions together into a package without adding to the content. This role is completely procedural, with no substantive contribution by the mediator, and in its simplest form it is completely passive, the mere carrying out of the parties' orders for the delivery of messages. Tact, wording, and sympathy mixed in equal doses with accuracy and confidentiality are necessary character traits of the mediator as communicator.

The second mode of mediation requires the mediator to enter into the substance of the negotiation. Since a conflict may not only impede communications between parties but be so encompassing that it prevents them from conceiving ways out of the dispute, the parties need a mediator as formulator.

Formulas are the key to a negotiated solution to a conflict; they provide common understandings of the problem and its solution or shared notions of justice to govern an outcome. Just as the conflict often prevents the parties from finding imaginative ways out, it may

also prevent them from recognizing the value of the mediator's suggestions at first hearing. Therefore, the mediator as formulator often needs to persuade the parties as well as to suggest solutions to their disputes. Persuasion involves power and therefore requires greater involvement than mere communication. Not only does the mediator get involved in the substance of the issue, it must also lean on the parties—albeit in the subtlest ways—to adopt its perceptions of a way out. Mediators as successful formulators must be capable of devising ways to unblock the thinking of the conflicting parties and to work out imaginative ways to skirt the commitments that constrain the parties.

The third mode requires the mediator to act as a manipulator. Here the mediator assumes the maximum degree of involvement, making itself a party to the solution if not to the dispute. As a manipulator, the mediator uses its power to bring the parties to an agreement, pushing and pulling them away from conflict and into resolution. First, the mediator must persuade the parties of its vision of a solution; it must then take measures to make that solution attractive, enhancing its value by adding benefits to its outcome and presenting it in such a way as to overcome imbalances that may have prevented one or the other of the parties from subscribing to it. The mediator may have to go so far as to improve the absolute attractiveness of the resolution by increasing the unattractiveness of continued conflict, which may mean shoring up one side or condemning another. Either of these approaches strains the appearance of its own neutrality. This is the role of the "full participant," such as American diplomats played in the 1970s Middle East peace process and in the 1980s Namibian-Angolan negotiations.

Mediation is a triangular relationship. When the mediator operates as a communicator, it operates as a bridge between two contestants or as a pump on the conduit between them. As a formulator, the mediator assumes a position of greater activity, one that pressure and messages emanate from as well as pass through. As a manipulator, the mediator becomes so active that it calls into question the triangular relationship. It may even unite the two adversaries in opposition to itself: for example, in the Yemen civil war the two sides resolved their differences to oppose Egyptian interference, when Egypt was acting more like an intervener than a mediator. But the mediator, by throwing its weight around, threatens and is threatened by the possibility of turning the triangle into a dyad. The mediator's threat to side with one party may bring the other party around, for fear that mediation might end and with it any possibilities for a solution. As a threat to the mediator, each party may try to win the

mediator over to its own side to increase its chances of winning rather than of having to come to terms. At the same time, of course, each party may regard the mediator with high suspicion as a potential ally of the other side. Although suspicion makes the mediator's job more difficult, it also keeps the mediator honest.

Power in Mediation

Power—the ability to move a party in an intended direction—is often referred to in mediation as leverage. Although leverage is the ticket to mediation, mediators tend to remain relatively powerless throughout the exercise. The extent of the mediator's power depends entirely on the parties whose acceptance of a mediator depends on the mediator's likelihood (potential power) of producing an agreement that can be supported by both sides. This circular relationship plagues every mediation exercise. Contrary to a common perception, mediators are rarely "hired" by the parties; instead, they have to sell their services, based on the prospect of their usefulness and eventual success. From the beginning, the mediator's leverage is at the mercy of the contestants. The parties, whose interest is in winning, view mediation as meddling unless it produces a favorable outcome. They welcome mediation only to the extent that the mediator has leverage over the other party, and they berate the mediator for trying to exert leverage over them.

A mediator has four sources of leverage: (1) the mediator's ability to portray an alternative future as more favorable than the continuing conflict, (2) the mediator's ability to produce an attractive position from each party's need for a resolution, (3) the availability of resources that the mediator can control; and (4) the availability of resources that the mediator can add to the outcome. In every case, the effectiveness of the mediator's leverage lies with the parties themselves, a characteristic that makes leverage in mediation difficult to achieve.

The first source of leverage is persuasion. The mediator in any mode must be able to point out the attractiveness of conciliation on available terms and the unattractiveness of continued conflict, a purely communicative exercise independent of any resources. Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, whose country was not devoid of resources or the willingness to use them, nevertheless spent long hours painting verbal pictures of the future with and without an agreement for Egyptian, Syrian, and Israeli audiences. His actions may not have been sufficient in the last rounds of the withdrawal

negotiations, but they certainly were necessary. President Jimmy Carter's mediation at Camp David in September 1978 and in Cairo and Jerusalem in March 1979 bear the same characteristics of the power and limitations of persuasion.

Mediation is unwelcome until it can provide the other party's agreement to a solution viewed favorably by the first party. This second source is the most problematic, and yet it is the basis of all mediation. The crucial moment in mediation comes when the mediator asks a party's permission to try for the other's agreement to a proposal; this exchange is the heart of the formulation mode. But its success depends on the parties' need for a way out of the impasse of conflict—demonstrating the importance of the mutually "hurting stalemate" as an element of the ripe moment. Chester Crocker, then assistant secretary of state, and his team shuttled back and forth between Angola and South Africa in search of attractive proposals to carry to each side, which were not forthcoming until the conditions of 1988 made the stalemate intolerable to both sides.

The remaining sources of leverage use the conflict and the proposed solution as their fulcrums, thus making manipulation their primary mode of mediation. Leverage derives from the mediator's ability to tilt toward or away from a party and thereby to affect the conditions of a stalemate or a movement out of it. The activity may be verbal, such as a vote of condemnation, or more tangible, such as visits, food aid, or arms shipments. The point of this leverage is to worsen the dilemma of the parties that are rejecting mediation and to keep them in search of a solution.

The mediator might shift weight to prevent one party from losing the conflict because the other's victory would produce a less stable and hence less desirable situation. Such activity clearly brings the mediator very close to becoming a party to the conflict. Arms to Israel and Morocco, down payments on better relations with South Africa, and abstentions on UN votes are examples of U.S. shifts in weight during various mediation processes. The Soviet Union threatened to shift weight away from India in the Security Council debate on the Indo-Pakistani war, and Britain threatened to shift weight against the Patriotic Front in Rhodesia. Threats of this kind demonstrate a willingness to shift weight and are effective to the degree that they are believed.

The last source of the mediator's leverage is the side payment, the subject to which the term *bricage* is usually applied. As weight shifts affect the continuing conflict, side payments may be needed to augment or enhance the outcome to one or more parties. Side payments require considerable resources and engagement from the

mediators, thus they are rarely made and are certainly not the key to successful mediation. Yet when the outcome is not large enough to provide sufficient benefits for both parties or to outweigh the present or anticipated advantages of continued conflict, some source of additional benefits is needed. Side payments may be attached to the outcomes themselves, such as third-party guarantees or financial aid in accomplishing changes required by the agreement, or they may be unrelated to the outcome itself, simply additional benefits that make agreement more attractive. The graduated aid package attached to the Israeli and Egyptian agreement to disengage in the Sinai and then to sign a peace treaty is an example. Sometimes the demand by the parties for side payments may be as extraneous to agreement as is the source of their supply.

The principal source of leverage is persuasion—the ability of the mediator to reorient the parties' perceptions. Like any kind of persuasion, the mediator's ability depends on many different referents that are skillfully employed to make conciliation more attractive and continuing conflict less so. These referents may include matters of domestic welfare and political fortunes, risks and costs, prospects of continuing conflict and of moving out of it, reputations, solidity of allies, support, world opinion, and the verdict of history, among others.

The other basic element in leverage is need—the parties' need for a solution that they cannot achieve by themselves, for additional support in regional or global relations, and for a larger package of payoffs to make a conciliatory outcome more attractive. Perception of this need can be enhanced by the mediator, but it cannot be created out of nothing. Side payments with no relation to the outcome of the conflict are effective only insofar as they respond to an overriding need of the parties that outweighs the deprivation of concessions on the issues of the conflict itself. Parties can be made aware of needs that they did not recognize before, particularly when the chances of assuaging them seem out of reach. The provision of Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola, which met South Africa's need for a countervailing reward, made the South African troop and administration withdrawal from Namibia possible; yet this need was not formulated during the 1970s rounds of the mediation. Persuasion often depends on need, but then need often depends on persuasion.

What do these characteristics say about "powerful" versus "powerless" mediators? The common distinction between "interested" versus "disinterested" mediators is less solid than might appear. All mediators have interests; most mediators are interested in the conflict

situation in some way, and "biased" mediators may even have an advantage in access to one or both of the parties. If mediation were only persuasion, or "pure" persuasion, it would not matter who practiced it, and entry into the practice would be equally open to any silver-tongued orator. But mediation is more than simple persuasion, and the basis of effective persuasion is the ability to fulfill both tangible and intangible needs of the parties. The mediator's leverage is based therefore on the parties' need for the solution it is able to produce and on its ability to produce attractive solutions from each party.

As long as they coordinate their activities, several mediators are often better than one. Although official mediators are usually needed as the chief actors and coordinators, unofficial (that is, nonstate) mediators may be effective persuaders and may be useful in helping to reorient the perceptions of the parties' values and opportunities. If the required mode of mediation is low—limited to communication—and the felt need for a solution is high in both parties, informal mediation may be all that is necessary to bring the parties to negotiation. The higher the required mode, the lower the felt needs, the more structural interests involving a third party, and the more the conflict involves states rather than nonstate actors, the less likely that informal mediation can be an effective substitute for the official attention of states. Statesmen are not necessarily better mediators, but they can provide interest- and need-related services that informal mediators cannot handle.

Unofficial mediation in the Horn of Africa provides a good illustration. A textbook case of mediation was effected by the World Council of Churches and the All-African Conference of Churches in the southern Sudanese civil war in 1972. The church bodies widened the perceptions of opportunity among the parties and persuaded them to move to resolution. The mediators were not unbiased, having closer ties with the southern Sudanese rebels than with the government, and were not without means of leverage, being able to threaten a resumption of supplies if the government broke off talks. The stalemate that had been building over the years was reinforced by a mediator-induced perception of an attractive way out for both parties. The nonstate mediator played a major role and deserves credit for the operation, the subsequent collapse of which a decade later was due to other causes, not to a failed mediation. But behind the nonstate mediator stood an international organization—the assistant secretary general of the OAU, Mohammed Sahnoun—and behind him stood a mediator of last resort—the emperor of Ethiopia Haile Selassie. At a number of telling points in the

operation, state actors were needed because guarantees that only a state could provide were required.

Nearly two decades later, another private mediation was attempted in a related conflict between the Eritrean rebels and the Ethiopian government. The private mediator was a former head of state, Jimmy Carter, who was perceived in the field as carrying official backing, although in fact he merely kept Washington informed and carried no more than official sympathy and interest. The demarche responded to the parties' appeal and was carried out with dedication and skill. It failed because the nature of the conflict changed during the mediation. The Tigrean rebellion entered the scene with its own successes and caused any ripeness in the previous moment to dissipate. The mediator was unable to persuade the parties of their deadlock or of their need to find a way out and unable to respond to any of the parties' needs for solutions, support, or side payments. Carter was in contact with heads of state in the region and obtained their sympathy and interest, even their benevolent neutrality during the mediation. But only states could have supplied the missing elements of support and side payments, and even then there is no guarantee that they would have been any more successful, especially given the absence of a ripe moment.

Many other mediations have benefited from a reversal of the roles portrayed in the Horn, that is, from informal support and assistance in a mediation performed by a state actor. In Zimbabwe, and more broadly in the Arab-Israeli dispute, many private efforts have helped strengthen the context and prepare the terrain for official mediation. Although any efforts to improve premediation conditions make a contribution, private efforts to mediate in the Northern Irish, Falklands, Cyprus, and current Arab-Israeli conflicts have been notorious failures. Ripe moments and leveraged buy-offs by state mediators are the necessary ingredients, and even they may not be sufficient.

Conclusions

More interest and less leverage are involved in third-party mediation than is commonly assumed. Adversarial parties and potential mediators each make an interest calculation that involves much more than the simple settlement of the dispute. Their calculations include relations among the conflicting parties and third parties and the costs and benefits of all of them in both conflict and conciliation. Leverage comes from harnessing those interests and from third

parties' ability to play on perceptions of needs—above all, on needs for a solution.

Mediation acts as a catalyst to negotiation. It facilitates the settlement of disputes that parties ought to be able to accomplish on their own if they were not so absorbed in their conflict. Mediation becomes necessary when the conflict is twice dominant: providing the elements of the dispute and preventing parties from seeking and finding a way out. Even when it is successful, mediation can only cut through some of those layers, providing a means for the parties to live together despite their dispute; it does not provide deep reconciliation or cancel the causes of the conflict. Left again to their own instincts, the parties may well fall out of their mediated settlement, and there are plenty of cases (often unstudied by analysts and practitioners focusing on the moment of mediation) in which the hard-bargained agreement subsequently fell apart under changed conditions or revived enmities. For this reason, although the mediator is often tempted to start a process and then slip away as it develops its own momentum, the mediator may in fact be required to be more involved in the regional structure of relations after a mediation effort than before. Yet it must not be a crutch forever, lest it become a party to the conflict. This is the final challenge and dilemma of mediation, the mediator must pay attention to follow-through and monitoring to keep the peace and yet be able to disengage.

Finally, there remains the question posed in the opening of this chapter, about the effects of the apparent ending of the Cold War on the prospects of conflict reduction through mediation. It is important to recognize that the underlying causes of conflict in the Third World will remain unaffected by the end of the Cold War. The end of U.S.-Soviet rivalry may lead to reduced interest in the Third World, and in that case, the motivation of states to intervene and mediate is also likely to decline.

Because of reduced interest, the amount of resources flowing to the Third World is likely to diminish. With reduced resources to invest in pursuing their goals by coercive means, many Third World actors may reach the plateau of a hurting stalemate sooner than they would have under Cold War circumstances. With the local antagonists having fewer resources at their disposal, third parties may find it easier to persuade adversaries about the need to settle for less than they had hoped for. Although the motivation to intervene and to mediate may diminish, the ability of mediators to bring about a settlement may be enhanced. Small and medium states, as well as unofficial mediators, may thus be able to play larger roles than they were able to play during the Cold War.

It remains to be seen which will have a greater effect on Third World conflicts—the diminished motivation to mediate or the enhanced capability to produce results if mediation is attempted.

Notes

This paper draws on our previous work, especially our most recent article, "Mediation in International Conflicts," in Kenneth Kressel, Dean G. Pruitt, et al., eds., *Mediation Research* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1989).

1. Edward P. Levine, "Mediation in International Politics: A Universe and Some Observations," *Peace Research Society (International) Papers*, Vol. 18 (1972), pp. 33-43.

2. Saadia Touval, "The Superpowers as Mediators," in Jacob Bercoff and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, eds., *Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management* (New York: Macmillan/St. Martin's Press, forthcoming).

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4. Touval, *The Peace Broker*; Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman, eds., *International Mediation: A Theory and Practice* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989); and Zartman, *Rite for Resolution*.

5. Touval, "The Superpowers as Mediators."

6. Hizkias Assefa, *Mediation of Civil Wars* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1987).
7. Touval, "Biased Intermediaries," *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1975), pp. 51-69.
8. Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution*.
9. Zartman, "The Middle East—Ripe Moment?" in G. Ben-Dor and D. Dwitt, eds., *Conflict Management in the Middle East* (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1987), pp. 285ff.

Congressional Record

CSCME A MIDDLE EAST SECURITY FRAMEWORK

HON. STENY H. HOYER

OF MARYLAND

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, September 22, 1993

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, the recent mutual recognition agreement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization is a historic step forward. Having fundamentally altered the politics of the Middle East, it makes the possibility of a broader security framework a reality. I believe that a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (CSCME), modeled on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), could make a significant and constructive contribution to that end. It offers a process by which barriers to

trade, travel, and communication can be dismantled and removed in which old hatreds and passions can be channeled into constructive dialogues between states and peoples and within which regional stability can be established.

In principle, several aspects of the CSCE are directly applicable to the Middle East. First, the built-in top-down process. Second, the CSCE's status as a political, rather than legal, framework that consensus decision-making through the broad and interested issues of security and arms, as comprehensive membership. As you know, Mr. Speaker, the CSCE—also known as the Helsinki process—is an ongoing multilateral forum now involving 53 states including the United States and Canada. The process was born with the signing of the Helsinki Final Act on August 1, 1975. In hindsight, the Helsinki Final Act's three sets of provisions on military, economic, and environmental cooperation, and human contacts and humanitarian affairs—represent a masterful balance between competing interests and objectives.

The Final Act initiated an ongoing dialogue in a often, bi-lateral, post-war Europe which had accumulated the deepest concentration of armaments in the history of humanity. The top-down process mandated by the Final Act brought competing blocs to the negotiating table to address the issues which divided them by reviewing, implementation and expanding the scope of their cooperation.

Even critics of the CSCE would agree that the political commitments undertaken by the participating states to implement objectives in the areas of military security, economic cooperation and the environment, and human rights and humanitarian concerns and the dialogue that revolved around the implementation of those commitments, needed and changed in the former Warsaw Pact. And dialogue in the CSCE is not restricted to parties. It involves the steps to a very large degree. (Citizens, citizens and nongovernmental organizations took up the moral dialogue and the notion of accountability and reached them back into the political realm of the CSCE. These aspects of the CSCE—political dialog and public participation—are critical in the Middle East.

The CSCE's rule of consensus is the natural and necessary counterpart to the dialog. Diverse and divided countries must be assured that the issues of critical importance to their national security and, indeed, their very existence, will not be threatened by merely taking part in a discussion. For this reason, the CSCE assures its participants that decisions will not be imposed upon them by a majority vote. Logically, there is a stronger basis for seeking compliance with commitments when they have been freely undertaken. In a process where even the smallest country has an equal vote, no state can refuse to implement a commitment on the grounds. It was simply outwitted. For these reasons, a CSCME should also incorporate consensus as the basis for making decisions.

In particular, the 10 principles of the Helsinki Final Act that guide relations between States exemplify the careful equilibrium necessary to give participating states a vested interest in the process, despite the barriers which have divided them. While Principle I provides for the sovereign equality of states and Principle VI mandates nonintervention in internal affairs, Principle VII requires respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and insisted on citizens the idea that states were accountable to the governed as well as to each other. While Principle IV speaks of the territorial integrity of states, Principle VIII recognizes the right to self-determination of peoples, and Principle I states that borders can be changed peacefully and in accordance with international law.

Even with the tremendous changes that Europe has undergone in the last several years, the wide range of issues covered in the CSCE continues to give every player some stake in the game. The agenda for a CSCME must likewise be shaped to reflect the issues which are of particular concern to the region. But in addition to other questions of special relevance to the Middle East, the original CSCE principles might serve as a useful outline for opening discussions on a CSCME. Based on more than 18 years of experience, I would argue that these principles have proved their worth. These concepts will take on increasing importance as the peoples of the Middle East demand more accountability from their leaders and as states do so from each other.

A Middle East security framework, in which all the states work together to reduce the likelihood of conflict, has reasonable and far-reaching appeal. Such a framework need not depend upon an exact convergence of values or an overall balance of power. A Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East can encourage regional security through arms control verification, confidence-building, and conflict prevention, just as the Helsinki Final Act provides for confidence-building measures in recognition of the integral interrelationship between the political and military aspects of security.

Both the United States and Russia could play an important role in seeing that a CSCME process is initiated because both share interest containing radical Islamic fundamentalism, stemming terrorism, and securing peace and security in the region. Boris Yeltsin's reformist government well understands the benefits of CSCE. The presence of a multilateral forum for discussion provides an outlet for grievances and a framework for conflict resolution. It must also be remembered that currently in the state of Israel are well over half a million Jews from the former Soviet Union. Though they fought for years to leave their homeland, they nevertheless maintain ties with Russia that can now attract and anchor Russian engagement in an ongoing CSCME process.

Of course, there are no guarantees that a CSCME could solve the complex and explosive problems confronting the Middle East. Meetings and documents can change nothing by themselves if the political will of the participating States is in question. But we are now at an historic juncture where long-absent political will may suddenly assist. We have just witnessed an agreement which has made the conditions for a long-term peace better than they have ever been before. In such a climate, a CSCE-type process can bring strength in its persistence, in its relentless determination to foster continued political will among its participating States and, just as important, among their citizens. The United States should be prepared to remain engaged in the process and to sustain what may be a new order in the Middle East.

Once implacable enemies, the PLO and Israel have now set the stage to live side by side in peace. At the White House signing Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin sadly noted that for many the ceremony has come too late. But weary of hate and revenge that have claimed so many lives, Israel and the PLO took a step toward creating a new order in the Middle East. The establishment of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East would provide an opportunity to bring healing and reconciliation to a region badly in need of both.

103^D CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. CON. RES. 181

Expressing the sense of the Congress that leaders in the Middle East should consider establishing a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NOVEMBER 16, 1993

Mr. HOYER (for himself, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, Mr. CARDIN, Mr. McCLOSKEY, Mr. FISH, Mr. RICHARDSON, Mr. WOLF, Mr. PORTER, and Mr. MARKEY) submitted the following concurrent resolution, which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the Congress that leaders in the Middle East should consider establishing a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East.

Whereas it is in the interest of the United States and the international community to promote security and cooperation through democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in the Middle East;

Whereas recent developments in the Middle East, including the signing of the historic Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, have given rise to new hopes for a just and lasting peace and new opportunities for cooperation in the region;

Whereas the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe has, since 1975, contributed to positive developments in Europe by providing a comprehensive framework for the consideration of questions relating to security, including a regime of confidence and security building measures; cooperation in the fields of economics, science and technology, and the environment; and cooperation in humanitarian and other fields; and

Whereas the framework and mechanisms of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, including those devoted to conflict prevention, could serve as useful models for enhancing security, promoting cooperation, and protecting human rights in the Middle East: Now, therefore, be it

1 *Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate*
2 *concurring)*, That it is the sense of the Congress that—

3 (1) it should be the policy of the Government
4 of the United States to encourage leaders in the
5 Middle East to consider establishing a Conference on
6 Security and Cooperation in the Middle East, modeled
7 on the Conference on Security and Cooperation
8 in Europe, as they attempt to overcome the legacy
9 of the past, strengthen peace and understanding,
10 and develop relations based on mutual respect and
11 confidence, respect for human rights and the rule of
12 law, and economic cooperation; and

13 (2) the Government of the United States, drawing
14 upon its extensive experience in the Conference

1 on Security and Cooperation in Europe, should con-
2 sult with interested parties, including the Govern-
3 ment of the Russian Federation, to explore the pos-
4 sibilities for establishing a Conference on Security
5 and Cooperation in the Middle East.

C

103D CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. CON. RES. 52

Expressing the sense of the Congress that leaders in the Middle East should consider establishing a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

NOVEMBER 17 (legislative day, NOVEMBER 2), 1993

Mr. DECONCINI (for himself, Mr. GRASSLEY, and Mr. D'AMATO) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the Congress that leaders in the Middle East should consider establishing a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East.

Whereas it is in the interest of the United States and the international community to promote security and cooperation through democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in the Middle East;

Whereas recent developments in the Middle East, including the signing of the historic Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, have given rise to new hopes for a just and lasting peace and new opportunities for cooperation in the region;

Whereas the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe has, since 1975, contributed to positive developments in Europe by providing a comprehensive framework for the consideration of questions relating to security, including a regime of confidence and security building measures; cooperation in the fields of economics, science and technology, and the environment; and cooperation in humanitarian and other fields; and

Whereas the framework and mechanisms of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, including those devoted to conflict prevention, could serve as useful models for enhancing security, promoting cooperation, and protecting human rights in the Middle East: Now, therefore, be it

1 *Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives*
2 *concurring)*, That it is the sense of the Congress that—

3 (1) it should be the policy of the Government
4 of the United States to encourage leaders in the
5 Middle East to consider establishing a Conference on
6 Security and Cooperation in the Middle East, modeled on the Conference on Security and Cooperation
7 in Europe, as they attempt to overcome the legacy
8 of the past, strengthen peace and understanding,
9 and develop relations based on mutual respect and
10 and confidence, respect for human rights and the rule of
11 law, and economic cooperation; and

12 (2) the Government of the United States, drawing upon its extensive experience in the Conference
13
14

1 on Security and Cooperation in Europe, should con-
2 sult with interested parties, including the Govern-
3 ment of the Russian Federation, to explore the pos-
4 sibilities for establishing a Conference on Security
5 and Cooperation in the Middle East.

○

The Royal Palace,
Amman, Jordan

26th October, 1993

Dear Senator DeConcini:

It is with immense pleasure that I read reports of your interest in a framework of security and cooperation for the Middle East and of the testimony given by Messrs. Abba Eban (former Foreign Minister of Israel) and William Zartman, (Director of African Studies at John Hopkins University) at a hearing of the Helsinki Commission on Security and Cooperation of Europe which, on 14th October, you had the honour of co-chairing at the American Congress.

As you probably know I have been campaigning for several years for the establishment of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (C.S.C.M.E.). I am delighted that you should have taken up this important feature of the politics of peace which Jordan has pursued for more than a decade. C.S.C.E. has set up a precedent that we should emulate so that we may be able to ensure the kind of progress which Europe has managed to obtain. Peace must be accompanied by a broad range of measures designed to enhance security and cooperation and includes provisions on military and security issues, economic, scientific, environmental and technological operation; as well as democratization and human rights. I find myself in complete agreement with you when you declared that the peace process could "find greater cohesion and direction in a C.S.C.E.-type content".

However, I am somewhat surprised by the response of both Eban and Zartman on the desirability of the process for the Middle East. The validity of Eban's reservation regarding human rights is questionable when we consider conditions in the former Soviet Union and the East European satellites at the time the Helsinki process was convened. I see no reason why the same endeavour in the Middle East could not lead to a similar conclusion. As for 'rogue states' in the region, I wonder what did Zartman think of the position of Romania under Ceauşescu or Bulgaria, to say nothing of the Soviet Union itself almost twenty years ago when Helsinki was set in motion.

.....2/

I urge you to maintain your interest and join our campaign for a worthy cause which will undoubtedly give the peace, security and cooperation to which all the peoples of the Middle East aspire and deserve, meaningful support.

With my kind regards and best wishes,

Yours very sincerely
El Hassan Bin Talal

El Hassan Bin Talal
Crown Prince of the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

Senator Dennis DeConcini
United States of America

Looking Beyond the Gulf War

A. Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East

Geo-Strategic Parameters	SECURITY DIMENSIONS		
	Military	Political	Economic
Demography		Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (CSCE)	The Intifada Palestinians in the GCC
Oil		Energy Strategy	Price Instability Subsidisation Fund
Water		International Court of Justice International Arbitration	Regional Water Plan
Debt		Regional Subsidisation Structural Adjustment	Regional Saving Fund Debt Reduction
Land		International Court of Justice International Arbitration	Regional Environmental Plan
Nuclearism (Nationalist and Regional)		Human Rights	Regional Development Fund
Terrorism		Democracy	Socio-Economic Development
Arms (Conventional & Non-Conventional)	Control of Weapons	Confidence Building Measures	Defense Expenditure Reduction

Amman - March 1991

Helsinki - Type Approaches for Middle East

EUROPE	U.S. - SOVIET	JORDAN
<p><i>Conference on Security & Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM)</i></p> <p><i>Palma de Mallorca Report</i> <i>Charter of Paris</i></p> <p><i>Three Dimensions :</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Security 2. Economic Dimension 3. Human Dimension <i>(Human rights, cultural dialogue, religious tolerance)</i> <p><i>Admission Ticket :</i> <i>Minimal standard of common ideas e.g. :</i></p> <p><i>Territorial Integrity</i> <i>Rejection of Force</i> <i>Arms Control</i></p>	<p><i>Search for Common Ground (SCG) and the Soviet Academy of Sciences</i> <i>(Institute of World Economy and International Relations, IMENO)</i></p> <p><i>Conference on Peace & Cooperation in the Middle East (CPCME)</i></p> <p><i>Baskets :</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Arms Control 2. Arab-Israeli Peace 3. Lebanon 4. Gulf 5. Regional Economic Development 6. Human Rights and Democratic Freedoms <p><i>Something for Everyone, Fearlessness, Flexible Baskets, Wiggle Room, Flexibility in Form and Language, Starting a Political Process, Equality of Participants.</i></p>	<p><i>Conference on Security & Cooperation in the Middle East (CSCME)</i></p> <p><i>Regional Matrix :</i></p> <p style="margin-left: 20px;"><i>Security</i></p> <p style="margin-left: 20px;"><i>Military Political Economic</i></p> <hr/> <p><i>People</i></p> <p><i>Resources</i></p> <p><i>Ideology</i></p> <hr/> <p><i>Starting Menu :</i></p> <div style="text-align: center;"> </div> <p><i>Regional Development Plan :</i></p> <p style="margin-left: 20px;"><i>Water</i></p> <p style="margin-left: 20px;"><i>Energy</i></p> <p style="margin-left: 20px;"><i>Transport</i></p>

Introduction

Jordan has been for some time advocating a "regional approach" to the problems of the Middle East. The aim is neither to evade specific issues that have to be specifically tackled, nor to contradict other initiatives. Rather, Jordan's purpose has been to evolve a global framework conducive to the resolution of the numerous regional crises that have to be addressed each on its own merits.

One side effect of the Gulf crisis has been the emergence of calls for "new" approaches to long-standing Middle East questions. "New security structure", "new regional order" and "new thinking" in the Middle East have become increasingly familiar terms. At the end of both World Wars, parallel sentiments for a new world order emerged. As the history of this century attests, blue - prints unfortunately did not work. A similar outcome in the case of the Middle East must now be avoided.

This note outlines Jordan's analytical approach to the challenges confronting its region. Its purpose is not to advocate particular solutions or blue - prints, but rather to highlight a regional matrix that can serve as a useful framework of thought. Regional factors (demography, resources, ideology) interact with security dimensions (military, political, economic). Such interaction generates complex regional problems. Efforts, with poor results so far, have been concentrated mainly on military tools for "containing" such challenges. The analysis illustrates Jordan's proposed alternative approach. A remedial expansion of the tools available to deal with transnational issues can be achieved through emphasizing the political and economic dimensions of security.

There is an increased awareness in the outside world of the socio - economic roots of conflict in the Middle East. Authoritarian regimes and an apparent neglect of festering problems by outside powers have contributed to the emergence of what has been termed as the politics of despair. Demographic trends, the widening gap between the "haves" and the "have - nots" and corruption have in their turn sparked off the economics of despair. This combination, the political economy of despair, has led the entire region to an extremely precarious and explosive situation. Democratization, freedom of expression, human rights and the accountability of rulers provide a route towards the alternative political economy of peace, security and progress.

The Note starts by considering Jordan's approach for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East in comparison with two other Helsinki - type concepts for the region : the European concept for a CSCM (Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean), and the American - Soviet idea for CPCME (Conference on Peace and Cooperation in the Middle East). In the post - Gulf - war period, emphasis on the triangle of Arms Control / Energy Policy / Debt and Regional Development can perhaps best contribute to evolving a trans - national approach to the challenges of peace.

CSCM, CPCME and CSCME

A number of proposals have been made for extending a Helsinki - type approach to the Middle East. Three separate but parallel initiatives have evolved in Europe, the United States and the Middle East.

1. *Europe* : Inspired by the Helsinki Process (CSCE), certain European nations have initiated efforts towards a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM). This has so far involved four European Community nations (Portugal, Spain, France, and Italy), five Arab countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania) as well as Malta. This effort was supported by the " Charter of Paris for a New Europe " which was adopted by the 34 member states in their CSCE summit in November 1990. The Charter, in the section devoted to the Mediterranean, states that " We consider that the fundamental political changes that have occurred in Europe have a positive relevance to the Mediterranean region. Thus, we will continue efforts to strengthen security and cooperation in the Mediterranean as an important factor for stability in Europe. We welcome the Report of the Palma de Mallorca Meeting on the Mediterranean, the results of which we all support ".

The Process envisaged by CSCM has three contexts :

- Security
- The Economic dimension
- The Human Dimension and the development of human rights, cultural dialogue and religious tolerance

The objective is to convene a CSCM that should be operational in 1993. An ad hoc Preparatory Committee is to be created for this purpose by the end of 1991. One idea for launching the process is through an " admission ticket " approach. Potential participants can subscribe to a minimal standard of common ideas (such as respect for territorial integrity, rejection of force, stopping arms race). The organisers of CSCM emphasize that there is no contradiction with other schemes like : setting up a new security organization, inter-Arab and inter-regional negotiation for a system of

cooperation in the Gulf ; a peace conference to solve specific issues. They stress that, to the contrary, a Helsinki - type approach for agreeing on rules and principles for coping globally with the issues in the area could be very useful to any other type of diplomatic or political initiative devoted to solving specific issues. Relevant United Nations resolutions (from 1945 to 1991) can be used to provide the political and legal basis for solving appropriate questions.

2. *The United States* : In October, 1990 a joint US - Soviet Task Force called for a new comprehensive strategy for the Middle East and recommended that the US and Soviet governments should jointly convene, under UN auspices, a Conference on Peace and Cooperation in the Middle East (CPCME). This initiative involves the American group Search for Common Ground (SCG) and the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMENO) of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

This effort aims at establishing a framework for new approaches, ideas and thinking about a variety of issues, or " baskets ", in the Middle East such as :

- *Arms Control - conventional and non - conventional.*
- *Arab-Israeli Peace.*
- *The Lebanese Crisis.*
- *The Gulf.*
- *Regional Economic Development and Cooperation.*
- *Human Rights and Democratic Freedoms.*

Search for Common Ground considers that CPCME can be innovative in providing :

- *Something for Everyone.*
- *Formlessness.*
- *Flexible Baskets.*
- *Flexibility in Form and Language.*
- *Starting a Political Process.*
- *Equality of Participants.*

3. *Jordan : Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (CSCME)*

Jordan's conceptual approach is based on viewing regional security through three basic route maps : military, political and economic. " Landmarks " or factors on this route map fall into three main groupings : firstly People (demography) ; secondly Resources / Environment and thirdly Ideology / Activism. Graphically, this concept can be illustrated in the form of a regional matrix. The three security dimensions are represented on the horizontal axis and the three groups of factors on the vertical axis

	Security		
	Military	Political	Economic
<i>People</i>			
<i>Resources / Environment</i>			
<i>Ideology / Activism</i>			

This matrix can be extended to varying degrees (see Matrix A and Matrix A') through sub - dividing regional factors into their constituent parts. Thus Resources / Environment can be sub - divided into : Oil, Water, Land and Debt for example. Ideology / Activism can be sub - divided into such parameters as Radicalism, Terrorism and Armaments. Problems generated by these regional factors can be tackled through military, political and economic instruments. Thus border disputes, classifies under " Land ", have been invariably dealt with in the region through military means.

Viewing the region through this matrix can reveal vividly the emphasis placed so far on the military dimension as an instrument to respond to challenges. The existing matrix is rich in military and internal security tools (Matrix A). Demography is controlled by police state methods.

Radicalism and terrorism are refuelled by the lack of democracy and the absence of freedom of expression. Claims on water rights and land are invariably settled by military force. In the Gulf alone there have been no fewer than 22 active border disputes since 1900. Desert Shield and Desert Storm, originally conceived to meet external Soviet threat, had to be dusted - off and put into action to face a threat from within the region. Military debts are easily accumulated as eager suppliers of arms compete for customers. The area has been one of the main world markets for armaments. Expenditures on arms in the Gulf reached hundreds of billions of dollars in the last two decades to no avail. In short, the existing situation is what has been depicted as the political economy of despair.

The approach advocated by Jordan aims at inverting, so to speak, the existing military - rich matrix. The political and economic dimensions of the matrix can be stimulated by a number of practical measures (Matrix A'). Thus democratization

MIDDLE EAST SECURITY
EXISTING MATRIX : A

Geo-Strategic Parameters	SECURITY DIMENSIONS		
	Military	Political	Economic
Demography	<i>Police State</i>		
Oil	- <i>Desert Storm</i> - <i>Desert Shield</i>		
Water	<i>Hydraulic Wars</i>		
Debt	<i>Military Debts</i>		
Land	<i>Border Disputes</i>		
Radicalism (Nationalistic and Religious)	- <i>Absence of Freedoms</i> - <i>Controlled Media</i>		
Terrorism	<i>Repression</i>		
Arms (Conventional & Non-Conventional)	<i>Arms Race</i>		

MIDDLE EAST SECURITY
 CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST (CSCME)

NEW MATRIX : A'

	SECURITY DIMENSIONS			Economic
	Military	Political		
Geo-Strategic Parameters		Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (CSCME)		The Intifada Palestinians in the GCC
Demography		Energy Strategy		Price Indexation Stabilization Fund
Oil		International Court of Justice International Arbitration		Regional Water Plan
Water		Regional Stabilization Structural Adjustment		Regional Sinking Fund Debt Reduction
Debt		International Court of Justice International Arbitration		Regional Environmental Plan
Land		Human Rights		Regional Development Fund
Radicalism (Nationalistic and Religious)		Democracy		Socio-Economic Development
Terrorism		Confidence Building Measures		Defense Expenditure Reduction
Arms (Conventional & Non-Conventional)	Control of Weapons			

and human rights should replace repression and police - state controls. Border and water rights disputes can be referred to the International Court of Justice or international arbitration. The European proposal for a CSCM is one peaceful approach for dealing with inter - regional demographic problems. The economic background to the Intifada and the regional demographic implications of the dispossession of the Palestinians are neglected facets of the Arab - Israeli conflict. They need to be soberly assessed in terms of Israel, the Occupied Territories and the GCC countries. These examples illustrate the instruments needed for evolving the political economy of peace and progress.

A most effective and timely approach to extend the Helsinki process to the Middle East is through a three - pronged strategy based on Energy Policy, Arms Control and Debt Reduction. These strategies imply the involvement not only of the regional players but also of relevant outside powers who happen to be members of the CSCE (the few exceptions are Japan, Brazil and China). This group of nations are integrally involved with the three dimensions of Energy, Arms and Debts in the Middle East. They are the main consumers of Middle East energy. They are its main suppliers of armaments. And they are its main creditors.

a) Energy Policy : " Energy " is conspicuously absent from the 1992 objectives in Europe. At the European Council meeting of June 1990 in Dublin, a proposal was made for the creation of a European energy network. This vision of a pan - European energy community from the Atlantic to the Urals provides another channel for economic cooperation between the EC and Eastern Europe including the Soviet Union. The eruption of the Gulf crisis has focussed further attention on this concept of tapping Soviet energy reserves in return for the transfer of technology and capital. Within the context of the Middle East, what is needed is a balanced energy policy among the main importers of oil not only in Europe but also in North

America and the Far East. The purpose is not to subjectively refer to "cheap oil or "expensive oil". Rather it is to evolve an alternative to the highly politicized confrontation between buyers and sellers. A comprehensive approach including the orderly development of alternative energy sources is a priority form the highly industrialized nations as well as for the oil producers. the 34 member states of the CSCE include all the major importers except for Japan. The CSCE can be used as an umbrella that transcends the international Energy Agency (IEA) to evolve a rational energy strategy based on the principles of the Charter of Paris. The section on Economic Cooperation in the Charter in fact states that " We are determined to give the necessary impetus for cooperation among our states in the fields of energy, transport and tourism for economic and social development. We welcome, in particular, practical steps to create optimal conditions for the economic and rational development of energy resources, with due regard for environmental considerations ". It should not be too cumbersome to include Japan and other nations (e.g China) in this effort. The confrontation between buyers and sellers (IEA and OPEC) ought to be superseded by a more productive approach. Monopsony vs Monopoly lead to instability.

In fact the Netherlands proposed at the Paris Summit a "European Energy Charter " to evolve a cooperative framework that assures stable supplies, stimulates central and East European production and safeguards the environment. It only makes sense to include the Middle East (the Gulf as well as the Maghreb) in such a framework. Apart from the dependence of Europe on oil from the Gulf, there is an increasing level of importation of gas from the Maghreb. Gas pipelines across the Mediterranean already link Maghreb producers with Italy and soon Spain, Portugal and possibly France and Germany.

b) Arms Control : The economics of the defence industry in the advanced countries make it prohibitively expensive for the industrial nations to equip their own armed forces with the best equipment unless their manufacturers find export outlets. Paradoxically, the easing of tensions in Europe and the success of negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), Confidence - and Security - Building Measures (-CSBM) and Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFRs), have had a negative impact on the developing countries. European armaments slated for destruction in accordance with the CFE Treaty have been increasingly transferred outside Europe. The CFE treaty does not include provisions prohibiting the transfer of armaments from European and North American manufacturers to the developing world including the Middle East. The ceilings placed on main weapons systems in Europe make it increasingly important for manufacturers to find alternative markets. Unless this matter is urgently tackled, the arms race in the Middle East will be exacerbated in the post - Gulf war period. The twelve main exporters of armaments are members of the CSCE except for Israel, China and Brazil.

c) Debt Reduction : All the non - oil producing countries in the Middle East suffer from major external debt problems. These problems are linked in no small way to the preceding issue of armaments. Unlike Eastern Europe, so far no concept of regional economic stabilization has emerged for the Middle East. Debt - ridden countries depend on hand - outs and subsidies coupled with IMF structural adjustments and austerity programmes. This approach has increased tensions between the haves and the have-nots in the region and has provided a fertile socio-economic environment for radicalism. A cornerstone of the new debt strategy under the CSCME is arms control. The successful implementation of arms control and arms reduction will release substantial funds that were previously wasted on armaments. Countries abiding by such a process will qualify for the systematic and

measured reduction of existing debts (most of which were accumulated through arms purchases in the first place). A cursory look at most indebted nations in the Middle East reveals that most, if not all, would no longer need continuous subsidies if the existing debt overhang is removed (this includes Turkey, Israel and Iraq). The key issue, however, is not the write - off of debts in a vacuum. It should be part of an arms control and reduction package coupled with appropriate economic adjustment policies (stabilization and structural adjustments).

To assist in this process, a Regional Debt Sinking Fund can be set - up by the oil rich countries in the area to share the burden with the CSCE countries in the debt reduction process. The application of the arms control process on the oil countries themselves will help release significant resources from their defence budgets.

The second pillar of the proposed debt reduction strategy is a regional socio - economic package. A Regional Development fund should be established to provide investment capital for those countries implementing stabilization and adjustment programmes. National and regional infra - structural programmes should be integrated to the extent possible. Water, energy, transport and telecommunications regional sectoral plans should be evolved. These can become the leading sectors in the economic revitalization of the post - war Middle East. Water, energy and transport can be viewed as the " steel and coal " for a new Middle East community including the non - Arab states of the region. A study by the World Bank has shown that in the past, only 5 % of the financial surplus of the oil rich countries was invested in the region. There is a need to evolve a new investment criteria and a new basis for calculating rates of return, to help channel part of the remaining 95 % into the region

To avoid disaster for itself and the world, the Middle East urgently needs a remedial expansion of the tools available to promote interdependence both intra- and inter-regionally. A utilitarian "worked-out rights" approach has to replace the ethical "intrinsic rights" approach before a meaningful cooperative strategy can emerge. What is needed is to institutionalize a new regional development thinking based on mutual gains and interests (both economic and social). Appropriate cost-benefit criteria at the regional level have to be evolved and applied to sectoral projects such as water, energy and transportation. Welfare economics has extensive tools relating to social cost benefit analysis that can be extended to an intra-regional context... To use the economic jargon, what is needed is to identify "externalities" (i.e. external socio-economic benefits to the region from particular investments) and internalize their effects (by transforming the incidental benefit into a product for which a price is charged). This can apply not only to water, energy and transportation but also to education and manpower migration. A number of multilateral agencies (such as the World Bank) can easily provide the technical expertise needed to evolve a new investment criteria for the region. Creative investment plans can, on the basis of such a new investment criteria, transform the existing regional Zero-sum game into a scenario of mutual gains and reconstruction.

A Commitment to Peace: Signing of The Israeli-Palestinian Declaration Of Principles

Text of Declaration of Principles On Interim Self-Government Arrangements

Following is the text of the Declaration of Principles between the Government of the State of Israel and the P.L.O. team (in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference) signed in Washington, DC, September 13, 1993 and released by the Office of the Spokesman

The Government of the State of Israel and the P.L.O. team (in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference) (the "Palestinian Delegation"), representing the Palestinian people, agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process. Accordingly, the two sides agree to the following principles

Article I

AIM OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, the elected Council (the "Council"), for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

Article II

FRAMEWORK FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD

The agreed framework for the interim period is set forth in this Declaration of Principles.

Article III

ELECTIONS

1. In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections will be held for the Council under agreed supervision and international observation, while the Palestinian police will ensure public order.

2. An agreement will be concluded on the exact mode and conditions of the elections in accordance with the protocol attached as Annex I, with the goal of holding the elections not later than nine months after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles.

3. These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.

Article IV

JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period.

Article V

TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND PERMANENT STATUS NEGOTIATIONS

1. The five-year transitional period will begin upon the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.

2. Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period, between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian people representatives.

3. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest.

4. The two parties agree that the outcome of the permanent status negotiations should not be prejudiced or preempted by agreements reached for the interim period.

Article VI

PREPARATORY TRANSFER OF POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, a transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the authorized Palestinians for this task, as detailed herein, will commence. This transfer of authority will be of a preparatory nature until the inauguration of the Council.

2. Immediately after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, with the view to promoting economic development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, authority will be transferred to the Palestinians on the following spheres: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism. The Palestinian side will commence in building the Palestinian police force, as agreed upon. Pending the inauguration of the Council, the two parties may negotiate the transfer of additional powers and responsibilities, as agreed upon.

Article VII**INTERIM AGREEMENT**

1. The Israeli and Palestinian delegations will negotiate an agreement on the interim period (the "Interim Agreement").

2. The Interim Agreement shall specify, among other things, the structure of the Council, the number of its members, and the transfer of powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Council. The Interim Agreement shall also specify the Council's executive authority, legislative authority in accordance with Article IX below, and the independent Palestinian judicial organs.

3. The Interim Agreement shall include arrangements to be implemented upon the inauguration of the Council, for the assumption by the Council of all of the powers and responsibilities transferred previously in accordance with Article VI above.

4. In order to enable the Council to promote economic growth, upon its inauguration, the Council will establish, among other things, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza Sea Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestinian Export Promotion Board, a Palestinian Environment Authority, a Palestinian Land Authority, and a Palestinian Water Administration Authority, and any other Authorities agreed upon, in accordance with the Interim Agreement that will specify their powers and responsibilities.

5. After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration will be dissolved, and the Israeli military government will be withdrawn.

Article VIII**PUBLIC ORDER AND SECURITY**

In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Council will establish a strong police force, which Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for defending against external threats, as well as the responsibility for internal security of Israel, for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order.

Article IX**LAWS AND MILITARY ORDERS**

1. The Council will be empowered to legislate, in accordance with the Interim Agreement, within all authorities transferred to it.

2. Both parties will review jointly laws and military orders presently in force in remaining spheres.

Article X**JOINT ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN LIAISON COMMITTEE**

In order to provide for a smooth implementation of this Declaration of Principles and any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, a Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee will be established in order to deal with issues requiring coordination, other issues of common interest, and disputes.

Article XI**ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC FIELDS**

Recognizing the mutual benefit of cooperation in promoting the development of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, an Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee will be established in order to develop and implement in a cooperative manner the programs identified in the protocols attached as Annex III and Annex IV.

Article XII**LIAISON AND COOPERATION WITH JORDAN AND EGYPT**

The two parties will invite the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives, on the one hand, and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt, on the other hand, to promote cooperation between them. These arrangements will include the constitution of a Continuing Committee that will decide by agreement on the

modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern will be dealt with by this Committee.

Article XIII**REDEPLOYMENT OF ISRAELI FORCES**

1. After the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, and not later than the eve of elections for the Council, a redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will take place, in addition to withdrawal of Israeli forces carried out in accordance with Article XIV.

2. In redeploying its military forces, Israel will be guided by the principle that its military forces should be redeployed outside populated areas.

3. Further redeployments to specified locations will be gradually implemented commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian police force pursuant to Article VIII above.

Article XIV**ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE GAZA STRIP AND JERICO AREA**

Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, as detailed in the protocol attached as Annex II.

Article XV**RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES**

1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Declaration of Principles, or any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, shall be resolved by negotiations through the Joint Liaison Committee to be established pursuant to Article X above.

2. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be resolved by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed upon by the parties.

3. The parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, which cannot be settled

through conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both parties, the parties will establish an Arbitration Committee.

Article XVI

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION CONCERNING REGIONAL PROGRAMS

Both parties view the multilateral working groups as an appropriate instrument for promoting a "Marshall Plan," the regional programs and other programs, including special programs for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as indicated in the protocol attached as Annex IV.

Article XVII

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

1. This Declaration of Principles will enter into force one month after its signing.

2. All protocols annexed to this Declaration of Principles and Agreed Minutes pertaining thereto shall be regarded as an integral part hereof.

DONE at Washington, D.C., this thirteenth day of September, 1993.

For the Government of Israel:
(SHELOM PERES)

For the P.L.O.
(YASSER ARAFAT)

Witnessed By
The United States of America
(WALTER CRISTOFER)

The Russian Federation
(ANDREY KOZYREV)

ANNEX I

PROTOCOL ON THE MODE AND CONDITIONS OF ELECTIONS

1. Palestine and Jerusalem will have their own laws, the majority of which in the field of internal security and public order will be agreed upon by the parties.

2. In addition to the mutual agreements that have been agreed upon, the following shall apply:

a. The system of elections will be the result of the agreed-upon mutual arrangements between the parties.

c. rules and regulations regarding election campaign, including agreed arrangements for the organizing of mass media, and the possibility of licensing a broadcasting and TV station.

3. The future status of displaced Palestinians who were registered on 4th June 1967 will not be prejudiced because they are unable to participate in the election process due to practical reasons.

ANNEX II

PROTOCOL ON WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM THE GAZA STRIP AND JERICHO AREA

1. The two sides will conclude and sign within two months from the date of entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, an agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. This agreement will include comprehensive arrangements to apply in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal.

2. Israel will implement an accelerated and scheduled withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, beginning immediately with the signing of the agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho area and to be completed within a period not exceeding four months after the signing of this agreement.

3. The above agreement will include, among other things:

a. Arrangements for a smooth and peaceful transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian representatives.

b. Structure, powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority in these areas, except external security, settlements, Israelis, foreign relations, and other mutually agreed matters.

c. Arrangements for the assumption of internal security and public order by the Palestinian police force consisting of police officers recruited locally and from abroad (holding Jordanian passports and Palestinian documents issued by Egypt). Those

who will participate in the Palestinian police force coming from abroad shall be trained as police and police officers.

d. A temporary international or foreign presence, as agreed upon.

e. Establishment of a joint Palestinian-Israeli Coordination and Cooperation Committee for mutual security purposes.

f. An economic development and stabilization program, including the establishment of an Emergency Fund, to encourage foreign investment, and financial and economic support. Both sides will coordinate and cooperate jointly and unilaterally with regional and international parties to support these aims.

g. Arrangements for a safe passage for persons and transportation between the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.

4. The above agreement will include arrangements for coordination between both parties regarding passages:

- Gaza-Egypt; and
- Jericho-Jordan.

5. The offices responsible for carrying out the powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority under this Annex II and Article VI of the Declaration of Principles will be located in the Gaza Strip and in the Jericho area pending the inauguration of the Council.

6. Other than these agreed arrangements, the status of the Gaza Strip and Jericho area will continue to be an integral part of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will not be changed in the interim period.

ANNEX III

PROTOCOL ON ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

The two sides agree to establish an Israeli-Palestinian Continuing Committee for Economic Cooperation, focusing, among other things, on the following:

1. Cooperation in the field of water, including a Water Development Program prepared by experts from both sides, which will also specify the mode

of cooperation in the management of water resources in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will include proposals for studies and plans on water rights of each party, as well as on the equitable utilization of joint water resources for implementation in and beyond the interim period.

2. Cooperation in the field of electricity, including an Electricity Development Program, which will also specify the mode of cooperation for the production, maintenance, purchase and sale of electricity resources.

3. Cooperation in the field of energy, including an Energy Development Program, which will provide for the exploitation of oil and gas for industrial purposes, particularly in the Gaza Strip and in the Negev, and will encourage further joint exploitation of other energy resources. This Program may also provide for the construction of a Petrochemical industrial complex in the Gaza Strip and the construction of oil and gas pipelines.

4. Cooperation in the field of finance, including a Financial Development and Action Program for the encouragement of international investment in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and in Israel, as well as the establishment of a Palestinian Development Bank.

5. Cooperation in the field of transport and communications, including a Program, which will define guidelines for the establishment of a Gaza Sea Port Area and will provide for the establishing of transport and communications lines to and from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to Israel and to other countries. In addition, this Program will provide for carrying out the necessary construction of roads, railways, communications lines, etc.

6. Cooperation in the field of trade, including studies and Trade Promotion Programs, which will encourage new regional and inter-regional trade, as well as feasibility studies of creating free trade zones in the Gaza Strip and in Israel, mutual access to these zones and cooperation in other areas related to trade and commerce.

7. Cooperation in the field of industry, including Industrial Development Programs, which will provide for the establishment of joint Israeli-Palestinian Industrial Research and Development Centers, will promote Palestinian-Israeli joint ventures, and provide guidelines for cooperation in the textile, food, pharmaceutical, electronics, diamonds, computer and science-based industries.

8. A program for cooperation in, and regulation of, labor relations and cooperation in social welfare issues.

9. A Human Resources Development and Cooperation Plan, providing for joint Israeli-Palestinian workshops and seminars, and for the establishment of joint vocational training centers, research institutes and data banks.

10. An Environmental Protection Plan, providing for joint and/or coordinated measures in this sphere.

11. A program for developing coordination and cooperation in the field of communication and media.

12. Any other programs of mutual interest.

ANNEX IV

PROTOCOL ON ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION CONCERNING REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

1. The two sides will cooperate in the context of the multilateral peace efforts in promoting a Development Program for the region, including the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, to be initiated by the G-5. The parties will request the G-7 to seek the participation in this program of other interested states, such as members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, regional Arab states and institutions, as well as members of the private sector.

2. The Development Program will consist of two elements:

a. an Economic Development Program for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip;

b. a Regional Economic Development Program.

A. The Economic Development Program for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will consist of the following elements:

(1) A Social Rehabilitation Program, including a Housing and Construction Program;

(2) A Small and Medium Business Development Plan;

(3) An Infrastructure Development Program (water, electricity, transportation and communications, etc.);

(4) A Human Resources Plan;

(5) Other programs.

B. The Regional Economic Development Program may consist of the following elements:

(1) The establishment of a Middle East Development Fund, as a first step, and a Middle East Development Bank, as a second step;

(2) The development of a joint Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian Plan for coordinated exploitation of the Dead Sea area;

(3) The Mediterranean Sea (Gaza)-Dead Sea Canal;

(4) Regional Desalination and other water development projects;

(5) A regional plan for agricultural development, including a coordinated regional effort for the prevention of desertification;

(6) Interconnection of electricity grids;

(7) Regional cooperation for the transfer, distribution and industrial exploitation of gas, oil and other energy resources;

(8) A Regional Tourism, Transportation and Telecommunications Development Plan;

(9) Regional cooperation in other spheres.

3. The two sides will encourage the multilateral working groups, and will coordinate towards their success. The two parties will encourage inter-sessional activities, as well as pre-feasibility and feasibility studies, within the various multilateral working groups.

AGREED MINUTES TO THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES ON INTERIM SELF-GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS

A. GENERAL UNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREEMENTS

Any powers and responsibilities transferred to the Palestinians pursuant to the Declaration of Principles prior to the inauguration of the Council will be subject to the same principles pertaining to Article IV, as set out in these Agreed Minutes below:

B. SPECIFIC UNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREEMENTS

Article IV

It is understood that:

1. Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: Jerusalem, settlements, military locations, and Israelis.

2. The Council's jurisdiction will apply with regard to the agreed powers, responsibilities, spheres and authorities transferred to it.

Article VI(2)

It is agreed that the transfer of authority will be as follows:

1. The Palestinian side will inform the Israeli side of the names of the authorized Palestinians who will assume the powers, authorities and responsibilities that will be transferred to the Palestinians according to the Declaration of Principles in the following fields: education and culture,

health, social welfare, direct taxation, tourism, and any other authorities agreed upon.

2. It is understood that the rights and obligations of these offices will not be affected.

3. Each of the spheres described above will continue to enjoy existing budgetary allocations in accordance with arrangements to be mutually agreed upon. These arrangements also will provide for the necessary adjustments required in order to take into account the taxes collected by the direct taxation office.

4. Upon the execution of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations will immediately commence negotiations on a detailed plan for the transfer of authority on the above offices in accordance with the above understandings.

Article VII(2)

The Interim Agreement will also include arrangements for coordination and cooperation.

Article VII(5)

The withdrawal of the military government will not prevent Israel from exercising the powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council.

Article VIII

It is understood that the Interim Agreement will include arrangements for cooperation and coordination between the two parties in this regard. It is also agreed that the transfer of powers and responsibilities to the

Palestinian police will be accomplished in a phased manner, as agreed in the Interim Agreement.

Article X

It is agreed that, upon the entry into force of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations will exchange the names of the individuals designated by them as members of the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee. It is further agreed that each side will have an equal number of members in the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee will reach decisions by agreement. The Joint Committee may add other technicians and experts, as necessary. The Joint Committee will decide on the frequency and place or places of its meetings.

ANNEX II

It is understood that, subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal, Israel will continue to be responsible for external security, and for internal security and public order of settlements and Israelis. Israeli military forces and civilians may continue to use roads freely within the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area.

DONE at Washington, D.C., this thirteenth day of September, 1993

For the Government of Israel:
(SHIMON PERES)

For the P.L.O.:
(MAHMOUD ABBAS)

Witnessed By:
The United States of America:
(WARREN CHRISTOPHER)

The Russian Federation:
(ANDREI KOZYREV) ■

Israel and Jordan Initial Common Agenda

Text of the Common Agenda

Following is the text of the Common Agenda between Israel and Jordan (Jordan and Israel), initiated in Washington, DC, September, 14, 1993, and released by the Office of the Spokesman

A. Goal

The achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace between the Arab States, the Palestinians and Israel as per the Madrid invitation

B. Components of Israel-Jordan (Jordan-Israel) Peace Negotiations

1. Searching for steps to arrive at a state of peace based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in all their aspects

2. Security

a. Refraining from actions or activities by either side that may adversely affect the security of the other or may prejudice the final outcome of negotiations

b. Threats to security resulting from all kinds of terrorism

c. Mutual commitment not to threaten each other by any use of force and not to use weapons by one side against the other including conventional and non-conventional, mass destruction weapons

II. Mutual commitment, as a matter of priority and as soon as possible, to work towards a Middle East free from weapons of mass destruction, conventional and non-conventional weapons; this goal is to be achieved in the context of a comprehensive, lasting and stable peace characterized by the renunciation of the use of force, reconciliation and openness

Note: The above (item c-II) may be revised in accordance with relevant agreements to be reached in the Multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security.

d. Mutually agreed upon security arrangements and security confidence building measures

3. Water

a. Securing the rightful water shares of the two sides

b. Searching for ways to alleviate water shortage

4. Refugees and Displaced Persons

Achieving an agreed just solution to the bilateral aspects of the problem of refugees and displaced persons in accordance with international law

5. Borders and Territorial Matters

Settlement of territorial matters and agreed definitive delimitation and demarcation of the international boundary between Israel and Jordan (Jordan-Israel) with reference to the boundary definition under the Mandate, without prejudice to the status of any territories that came under Israeli Military Government control in 1967. Both parties will respect and comply with the above international boundary.

6. Exploring the potentials of future bilateral cooperation, within a regional context where appropriate, in the following:

a. Natural Resources
—Water, energy and environment
—Rift Valley development

b. Human Resources
—Demography
—Labor
—Health
—Education
—Drug control

c. Infrastructure
—Transportation: land and air
—Communication

d. Economic areas including tourism

7. Phasing the discussion, agreement and implementation of the items above including appropriate mechanisms for negotiations in specific fields

8. Discussion on matters related to both tracks to be decided upon in common by the two tracks

C. It is anticipated that the above endeavor will ultimately, following the attainment of mutually satisfactory solutions to the elements of this agenda, culminate in a peace treaty ■



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